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INTRODUCTION
The Alaska Law Review’s Year in Review is a collection of brief summaries of selected state and
federal appellate cases concerning Alaska law. They are neither comprehensive in breadth, as
several cases are omitted, nor in depth, as many issues within individual cases are omitted.
Attorneys should not rely on these summaries as an authoritative guide; rather, they are intended
to alert the Alaska legal community to judicial decisions from the previous year. The summaries
are grouped by subject matter.
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Denali Citizens Council v. State, Dep’t of Natural Resources
In Denali Citizens Council v. State, Dep’t of Natural Resources,1 the supreme court held that,
although the Department of Natural Resources (“DNR”) is required to consider the economic
feasibility of a proposed exploration license, the DNR need not assess the feasibility of potential
alternatives to the proposal.2 The Denali Citizens Council (“Denali Citizens”) recommended an
alternative license and objected to the DNR’s initial best interest finding (“BIF”) and requested
reconsideration of the final BIF, which was confirmed, before appealing to the superior court,
which affirmed the final BIF.3 On appeal, Denali Citizens argued that the DNR’s consideration
of the license did not adequately consider the potential economic feasibility of the Denali
Citizens alternative.4 The supreme court affirmed the lower court, reasoning that DNR’s
economic feasibility analysis need only reach the proposed plan and not alternatives raised by
public comments.5 The supreme court further reasoned that the economic feasibility of the plan
as proposed does not depend on the feasibility of alternatives, rendering Denali Citizens
argument irrelevant.6 Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held that the DNR is only
required to consider the economic feasibility of proposed exploration licenses, not alternatives to
the proposal.7
Harris v. M-K Rivers
In Harris v. M-K Rivers,8 the supreme court held the Workers’ Compensation Board (“Board”)
may impose penalties on an employer for bad faith controversion of an employee’s claim for
medical benefits, even when the employee has not presented the employer with a bill for
treatments.9 In 1976, Harris suffered work-related injuries that rendered him a paraplegic in need
of extensive and continuing medical treatment.10 In 2006, M-K Rivers, Harris’s employer,
controverted payments related to Harris’s many medical conditions.11 Harris challenged these
controversions, and the Board ruled that several of them were in bad faith because M-K Rivers
made them on the basis of insufficient evidence.12 The Board imposed statutory penalties for
these bad faith controversions.13 M-K Rivers appealed this ruling to the Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Commission (“Commission”), which held that the penalties could not be imposed
because Harris, never having purchased the treatments that were controverted, failed to present
M-K Rivers with a bill; thus, the payment was never “due”.14 Harris appealed.15 The supreme
court reversed on this issue, holding that penalties may be imposed for bad faith controversions
1
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of medical treatments that have been prescribed but not yet paid for.16 The court reasoned that an
employer would have an incentive to controvert medical treatments in bad faith if it only had to
pay a penalty when presented with a bill from an employee, because the employee would likely
be unable to afford the treatment in the first place due to the controversion.17 Reversing the
Commission’s decision in part, the supreme court held the Workers’ Compensation Board may
impose penalties on an employer for bad faith controversion of an employee’s claim for medical
benefits, even when the employee has not presented the employer with a bill for treatments. 18
Dennis v. State, Dep’t of Administration
In Dennis v. State, Dep’t of Administration19, the supreme court held that verifications of breath
test instrument calibration performed by the instrument’s software are compliant with controlling
regulation.20 Dennis was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol.21 A breath test
revealed that his breath alcohol concentration was over the legal limit; subsequently, his driver’s
license was revoked.22 Dennis filed a motion to suppress the breath test result at a hearing to
contest the revocation.23 He argued that the verification of the instrument’s calibration was not
compliant with the applicable regulation. 24 The lower court rejected his motion to suppress the
breath test result and affirmed the license revocation.25 On appeal, Dennis argued that the
verification of an instrument’s calibration must be completed by the scientific director or by a
qualified person designated by the scientific director,26 and that allowing the verification to be
completed by the instrument’s software was not within regulation27. The supreme court affirmed
the lower court's decision, reasoning that the scientific director ensures that the proper
verification procedure is included in the instrument’s software.28 Further, the court noted that the
verification reports generated by the instruments are reviewed by the scientific director before
they are signed.29 Affirming the lower court's decision, the supreme court held that the
instrument calibration verification procedure used by the Department of Public Safety is
compliant with regulation.30
Alaska Community Action on Toxics v. Hartig
In Alaska Community Action on Toxics v. Hartig,31 the supreme court held that the public interest
exception to the mootness doctrine will not apply when the same fact pattern is unlikely to occur
again due to changes in the applicable regulations.32 Alaska Community Action on Toxics
16
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(“ACAT”) and Alaska Survival brought suit against the State Department of Environmental
Health (“the Department”) for issuing a permit to the Alaska railroad corporation for the use of
herbicides.33 The public interest organizations alleged that the issuance of the permit violated
public notice requirements and due process concerns.34 The administrative law judge and the
superior court affirmed the Department’s issuance of the permit.35 On appeal the public interest
groups continued to challenge the permit’s validity.36 The supreme court held that the issues on
appeal were moot and did not fall under the public interest exception.37 The permit at issue had
already expired and new regulations were set in place for issuance of the permits so the same fact
pattern was unlikely to occur again.38 Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held that the
public interest exception to the mootness doctrine will not apply when the same fact pattern is
unlikely to occur again due to changes in applicable regulations.39
Municipality of Anchorage v. Holleman
In Municipality of Anchorage v. Holleman,40 the supreme court held a referendum application is
properly viewed as legislative, rather than administrative, when it makes new law, is permanent
and general, and provides a public purpose as well as the methods for accomplishing it.41 The
Anchorage Assembly (“Assembly”) passed an ordinance that amended the Employee Relations
chapter of the Anchorage Municipal Code.42 Two citizen-sponsors filed a referendum
application to repeal the ordinance.43 The Municipality of Anchorage (“Municipality”) rejected
the application, reasoning it dealt with administrative rather than legislative matters.44 The
superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the citizen-sponsors and ordered the
Municipality to accept the referendum application.45 On appeal, the Municipality argued the
application is barred because it fails to make new law and is impermanent, making it an
administrative rather than legislative ordinance.46 The supreme court affirmed the superior
court's decision, reasoning that the ordinance is legislative because it makes new law that is both
permanent and general and declares a public purpose while providing a method of accomplishing
it.47 The court further reasoned that a legislative ordinance will not become administrative
merely because it contains administrative elements secondary to its primarily legislative
purpose.48 Affirming the superior court's decision, the supreme court held the citizen-sponsors’
referendum application was properly viewed as legislative because it made new law, was
permanent, and provided a public purpose as well as the methods of accomplishing it.49
33

Id. at 362.
Id.
35
Id. at 365.
36
Id. at 366.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 368.
39
Id. at 366–67.
40
321 P.3d 378 (Alaska 2014).
41
Id. at 387.
42
Id. at 380.
43
Id. at 381.
44
Id. at 380.
45
Id. at 381.
46
Id. at 385–87.
47
Id. at 385–87.
48
Id. at 387.
49
Id. at 387.
34

4

Davis Wright Tremane LLP v. State, Dep’t of Administration
In Davis Wright Tremane LLP v. State, Dep’t of Administration,50 the supreme court held that
administrative agencies have the deferential discretion to forbid consideration bids for contracts
submitted after the deadline for proposals.51 A state agency issued a request for proposals for
legal services, and a law firm submitted a proposal after the submission deadline.52 Nonetheless,
the agency awarded that law firm the contract, and a second law firm protested, alleging that the
first firm’s proposal was barred by relevant regulation because it was submitted late.53 An
administrative agency rescinded the contract award to the first firm, and denied the first firm’s
appeal, so the firm filed suit.54 The lower court held that the administrative agency acted
reasonably when it prohibited consideration of any late-filed proposal.55 On appeal, the first firm
argued that the administrative agency’s strict interpretation of relevant agency guidelines
regarding late-filed proposals is not reasonable or consistent with the statute because the
regulation must be interpreted per a common law materiality standard.56 The supreme court
affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that because the administrative agency’s
interpretation is longstanding and entitled to particular deference, it must be reasonably
interpreted to bar acceptance of late proposals.57 Additionally, the common law materiality
standard is not expressly adopted in the administrative agency’s guidelines, nor is it harmonious
with legislative intent.58 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that an
administrative agency’s strict interpretation of guidelines forbidding consideration of late-filed
proposals for agency contracts is reasonable and consistent with applicable law.59
Brandner v. Municipality of Anchorage
In Brandner v. Municipality of Anchorage,60 the supreme court held that an administrative
board’s misunderstanding of an appraiser’s property estimate constitutes a fundamentally wrong
principle of valuation.61 Bradner requested Municipality of Anchorage assessor Munoz to value
her property for the 2012 tax year.62 Munoz concluded that Brandner’s property was essentially
worth $560,700, but that in light of repair work needed, $499,400 was a fair estimate of the
property’s value.63 Brandner obtained an independent appraisal which valued the property for
much less.64 Seemingly accepting Munoz’s appraisal, the Anchorage Municipal Board of
Equalization adopted the base value of $576,000 but accepted Bradner’s repair estimate of
$140,000, concluding that the property was worth $427,000.65 The superior court held that it was
50
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well within the Boards discretion to adopt the Municipality assessor’s estimate of the property’s
value over Brandner’s.66 On appeal, Brandner argued that the Board the Municipality’s adopted
base value was arbitrary and had no basis in the record.67 The supreme court reversed the lower
court's decision, reasoning that the court had misunderstood Munoz’s appraisal testimony in
adopting $567,000 as the value of the land and that a final assessed value of $420,700 was more
consistent with its expressed intent in relying on Munoz’s appraisal.68 An administrative property
evaluation will be upheld except when there is a clear adoption of a fundamentally wrong
principle of valuation or fraud.69 Reversing the lower court's decision, the supreme court
held that an administrative board’s misunderstanding of an appraiser’s property estimate
constitutes a fundamentally wrong principle of valuation.70
Brown v. Personnel Board for City of Kenai
In Brown v. Personnel Board for City of Kenai71, the supreme court held that the Personnel
Board (“the Board”), in acting as an appellate tribunal, stated an adequate basis for a city
employee’s termination in concluding that the employee was terminated due to misconduct,
without affirming whether the employee had committed acts of sexual harassment.72 Brown, a
city employee, appealed his termination of employment to the Board after being terminated by
the city manager due to actions that constituted sexual harassment and misconduct.73 The Board,
in affirming the city manager’s decision to terminate Brown, found that Brown was terminated
not due to sexual harassment, but rather due to actions qualifying as misconduct.74 On appeal,
Brown argued that the Board had violated his due process rights and that there was no cause for
his termination of employment, reasoning that the Board’s decision indicated a rejection of the
city manager’s finding that Brown had engaged in sexual harassment.75 The supreme court
affirmed the Board’s decision and found that the Board’s statement affirming that Brown was
terminated due to misconduct did not constitute an independent finding that Brown was innocent
of sexual harassment.76 The court further reasoned that the Board’s disputed language, when
viewed in context of the Board’s conclusion that the city manager’s determination was
reasonable, was only an acknowledgement that the official cause for Brown’s termination was
misconduct.77 Moreover, the supreme court reasoned that even if the Board’s language did
indicate that Brown was innocent of sexual harassment, there was substantial evidence
supporting a finding that Brown’s actions constituted misconduct warranting termination.78
Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that the Board stated an adequate
basis supporting the determination that the city employee was terminated due to misconduct
warranting dismissal.79
66
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Schlumberger Technology Corp. v. State, Dep’t of Revenue
In Schlumberger Technology Corp. v. State, Dep’t of Revenue,80 the supreme court held that the
Alaska Net Income Tax Act (ANITA) does not incorporate by reference the Internal Revenue
Code provision which addresses income reporting by foreign corporations.81 Schlumberger
Technology, a wholly owned subsidiary of the foreign corporation Schlumberger Limited, filed
Alaska tax returns on behalf of Schlumberger Limited’s domestic subsidiaries for the tax years
1998–2000.82 In 2003, a Department of Revenue auditor determined that Schlumberger
Technology should have included 20% of Schlumberger Limited’s dividends received from
foreign corporations in its apportionable income.83 This audit adjustment stemmed from
ANITA, which requires corporate taxpayers to exclude 80% of dividends received from foreign
corporations.84 Schlumberger Technology objected to the adjustment before an administrative
judge then appealed to superior court,85 referencing an Internal Revenue Code provision which
requires the exclusion of all foreign dividend income received by a foreign corporation.86 The
superior court affirmed the administrative decision, holding that the foreign dividends paid to
Schlumberger Limited should have been included in the taxable income under ANITA.87 On
appeal, Schlumberger Technology argued that because ANITA incorporated by reference the
Internal Revenue Code’s provision, the foreign dividends were not taxable.88 The supreme court
affirmed the superior court’s decision, reasoning that the ANITA provision for calculating the
taxable portion of foreign dividends earned by an Alaskan taxpayer was inconsistent the formula
from the Internal Revenue Code.89 The court further reasoned that the Internal Revenue code
excludes certain foreign dividends received by a foreign corporation, while ANITA makes no
distinction between foreign or domestic reporting corporations.90 Affirming the superior court’s
decision, the supreme court held that ANITA does not incorporate by reference the Internal
Revenue Code provision which addresses income reporting by foreign corporations.91
Silver Bow Construction v. State
In Silver Bow Construction v. State,92 the supreme court held that varying from length
requirements of requests for proposals does not render the response non-responsive and
accepting responses exceeding the page limit does not violate the equal protection rights of
competing bidders.93 The Department of Administration, Division of General Services accepted
a response to a request for proposals for renovating the Governor’s House that exceeded the page
limit by five pages, and a competing bidder sued, arguing the variance obligated the Division to
reject the response.94 The lower court upheld the Division’s decision to accept the response.95 On
80
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appeal, the competing bidder argued that the greater number of pages provided an unfair
advantage and violated their right to equal protection. The supreme court affirmed the lower
court’s decision, reasoning that the page number variance did not give the response any
substantial advantage because the competing bidder actually submitted more words in fewer
pages.96 Additionally, no equal protection violation existed because the record lacks any
evidence of disparate treatment, and both proposals included deficiencies.97 Affirming the lower
court’s decision, the supreme court held that exceeding the page limit for proposals does not
disqualify a response or violate the equal protection rights of competing bidders.98
Blas v. State, Dep’t of Labor & Workforce Development,
In Blas v. State, Dep’t of Labor & Workforce Development,99 the supreme court held an agency
can reasonably deny a claimant unemployment benefits when there is evidence of intent to
defraud the agency’s benefit system.100 Blas collected unemployment benefits for several years
through the Department of Labor and Workforce Development (“the Division”).101 In 2011 and
2012, Blas failed to report that (1) he received 13 weeks worth of benefits erroneously because
he had also received work income;102 and (2) he traveled to Idaho for reasons unconnected with
applying to jobs.103 The Division determined Blas committed fraud by failing to make these
reports and denied him future benefits for one year.104 The Appeals Tribunal, Commissioner, and
superior court all affirmed the Division’s determination.105 On appeal, the supreme court
affirmed, granting Chevron deference to the agency’s factual findings regarding Blas’s work and
travel.106 The court also held the statute required subjective intent to defraud before denying a
claimant future benefits and that Blas had the requisite intent.107 Affirming the agency and lower
court decisions, the supreme court held that an agency can deny future unemployment benefits
when there is evidence of an intent to defraud the agency’s benefit system.108
Harris v. M-K Rivers
In Harris v. M-K Rivers,109 the supreme court held the Workers’ Compensation Board (“Board”)
may impose penalties on an employer for bad faith controversion of an employee’s claim for
medical benefits, even when the employee has not presented the employer with a bill for
treatments.110 In 1976, Harris suffered work-related injuries that rendered him a paraplegic in
need of extensive and continuing medical treatment.111 In 2006, M-K Rivers, Harris’s employer,
95
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controverted payments related to Harris’s many medical conditions.112 Harris challenged these
controversions, and the Board ruled that several of them were in bad faith because M-K Rivers
made them on the basis of insufficient evidence.113 The Board imposed statutory penalties for
these bad faith controversions.114 M-K Rivers appealed this ruling to the Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Commission (“Commission”), which held that the penalties could not be imposed
because Harris, never having purchased the treatments that were controverted, failed to present
M-K Rivers with a bill; thus, the payment was never “due”.115 Harris appealed.116 The supreme
court reversed on this issue, holding that penalties may be imposed for bad faith controversions
of medical treatments that have been prescribed but not yet paid for.117 The court reasoned that
an employer would have an incentive to controvert medical treatments in bad faith if it only had
to pay a penalty when presented with a bill from an employee, because the employee would
likely be unable to afford the treatment in the first place due to the controversion.118 Reversing
the Commission’s decision in part, the supreme court held the Workers’ Compensation Board
may impose penalties on an employer for bad faith controversion of an employee’s claim for
medical benefits, even when the employee has not presented the employer with a bill for
treatments.119
Grundberg v. State Commission for Human Rights
In Grundberg v. State Commission for Human Rights120, the supreme court held that, per
statutory authority, the Alaska State Commission for Human Rights (“the Commission”) has the
discretion to dismiss a complaint when the complainant files a second claim in court “based on
the same facts,” even when one complaint alleges new facts for other claims for
relief.121 Grundberg filed an employment discrimination complaint with the Commission for
Human Rights after she was denied a promotion at work for reasons she believed had to do with
her sex, age, and race.122 The claim was initially dismissed but remanded for further
proceedings.123 While those proceedings were pending, Grundberg filed a civil complaint in
superior court, alleging the facts contained in her complaint with the Commission as well as
several new facts.124 Accordingly, the Commission dismissed her complaint, per its statutory
authority to do so whenever the complainant files a second claim in another forum based on the
same facts.125 Grundberg appealed the dismissal.126 The lower court affirmed the
dismissal.127 On appeal, Grundberg argued that the shared facts in her two complaints served
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merely as factual background in the claim she filed in civil court.128 The supreme court affirmed
the lower court's decision, reasoning that the same underlying facts were being used to make out
the same claims for relief in both of Grundberg’s complaints, and were not merely
historical.129 Further, the court noted that it was irrelevant that the second complaint contained
new facts as well.130 Affirming the lower court's decision, the supreme court held that the
Commission may dismiss a complaint when it was been duplicated elsewhere based on the same
facts, even if the duplication contains additional facts.131
Adamson v. Municipality of Anchorage
In Adamson v. Municipality of Anchorage,132 the supreme court held that once the presumption
of work-related causation is met, the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board should not allow the
municipality to rebut the presumption through expert testimony.133 After working as a firefighter
for the Municipality of Anchorage for over thirty years, John Adamson retired in 2011 after
being diagnosed with prostate cancer in August 2008.134 Prostate cancer is presumed by statute
to be work-related for certain firefighters, as long as they meet certain requirements.135The
Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board determined that Adamson did qualify for the
presumption, and did not allow the municipality to present evidence through expert testimony
that there is no known cause of prostate cancer to rebut the presumption.136 The Workers’
Compensation Appeals Commission agreed with the Board that Adamson met the presumption,
but reversed the Board’s decision to disallow expert testimony by the municipality.137 On appeal,
the municipality argues that the expert testimony could be enough to rebut the presumption of
work-related causation for prostate cancer because it identifies that there is no known cause of
prostate cancer.138 The supreme court reversed in part, reasoning that the Commission erred in
allowing the municipality to rebut the presumption through expert testimony because the rebuttal
must be evidence that is personal to the claimant, not broad negations of the statute’s basis.139
Reversing the Commission in part, the supreme court held that a presumption of work-related
cancer causation cannot be rebutted through expert testimony as long as the claimant meets the
requirements of the presumption.140
Garibay v. State, Dep’t of Administration
In Garibay v. State, Dept. of Administration,141 the supreme court held that when there is
probable cause for arrest, an investigative stop is not shocking police misconduct sufficient for
the exclusionary rule to apply to license revocation proceedings.142 Here, a seemingly drunk man
128
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ran into and yelled at a woman in a grocery store, and she called the police after following him to
the parking lot to see his license plate number.143 Shortly afterwards, the police located his car in
a nearby parking lot as an investigative stop.144 Although they parked directly behind the car
with their emergency lights activated, the man attempted to back out of the spot.145 After
knocking on the man’s window, the police spoke with him and observed he was swaying, had
bloodshot eyes, and smelled of alcohol.146 The man was arrested for a DUI after he failed three
field sobriety tests, and his license was subsequently revoked for 90 days.147 Following a DMV
administrative hearing, the superior court affirmed the revocation of his license and held that the
legality of the stop was irrelevant in license revocation proceedings.148 On appeal, the man
argued that the investigative stop was illegal and the exclusionary rule should apply to his
case.149 The supreme court affirmed the superior court’s decision, reasoning that the investigative
stop was not shocking police misconduct because it was based on the earlier report from the
woman at the grocery store.150 The court further reasoned that after the investigative stop, there
was probable cause for arrest due to the police’s observations of the man’s
drunkenness.151 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held when there is
probable cause for arrest, an investigative stop is not shocking police misconduct sufficient for
the exclusionary rule to apply to license revocation proceedings.152
Ellingson v. Lloyd
In Ellingson v. Lloyd,153 the supreme court held that amendment to regulations promulgated by
the Alaska Board of Game were invalid because they effectively confiscated lawfully owned
domestic animals.154 Charles Dorman, a bison farmer on Kodiak Island, owned more than 200
bison that he kept on land he acquired in two grazing leases from the State of Alaska.155 Because
portions of that land included tidal flats, there were areas that could not be fenced in and allowed
bison to stray beyond the grazing lease onto the Wild Creek/Hidden Basin area of state land.156
As a result, when the Board of Game amended regulations to allow the hunting of feral bison and
defined feral bison as those not within the specific boundaries of a state grazing lease, Dorman’s
wayward bison became hunt-able under those amended regulations.157 On appeal, the Board of
Game argued that, pursuant to its authority to regulate domestic animals introduced into the wild
that have become feral, its amendment to the definition of feral was reasonable and not
arbitrary.158 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that the amended
definition was arbitrary because they disregarded common law, dictionary and scientific
143
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definitions of feral, and it disregarded previous inquiries into how the term should be defined.159
The court also held that the new definition of feral conflicted with other statutes.160 The supreme
court reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that statutes amending definition of feral and
allowing the hunting of feral bison were invalid.161
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ARBITRATION LAW
State v. Public Safety Employees Association
In State v. Public Safety Employees Association, the supreme court held that an arbitration award
of reinstatement with back pay for an employee who has engaged in sexual misconduct does not
violate an explicit, well-defined, and dominant public policy in Alaska.162 In April 2009, an
Alaska state trooper had consensual sex with a domestic violence victim the morning after he
had been dispatched to the victim’s house to address a disturbance with her husband.163 The
trooper was discharged from his position, and the Public Safety Employees Association
subsequently filed a grievance with the State of Alaska.164 The matter went to arbitration, and
arbitrator ultimately decided to reinstate the trooper with back pay.165 The superior court upheld
the arbitrator’s order of back pay, and reasoned that it would have enforced the trooper’s
reinstatement, but could not because his license had been revoked.166 On appeal, the State argued
that the arbitration award should be vacated in full as contrary to public policy.167 The supreme
court affirmed the superior court’s decision, reasoning that no public policy required termination
rather than suspension or other remedies for non-criminal sexual misconduct.168 The court also
reasoned that the public policy exception to the enforcement of arbitration awards must be
considered in terms of the arbitrator’s decision, not the conduct of the employee.169 Affirming
the superior court’s decision, the supreme court held that an arbitration award of reinstatement
with back pay for an employee who has engaged in sexual misconduct does not violate an
explicit, well-defined, and dominant public policy in Alaska.170
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BUSINESS LAW
ConocoPhillips Alaska, Inc. v. Williams Alaska Petroleum, Inc.
In ConocoPhillips Alaska v. Williams Alaska Petroleum, Inc.,171 the supreme court held that
reply correspondence only qualifies under the “dickered-for” terms exception to UCC § 2-207(1)
contract acceptance when the terms differ significantly and materially from a sufficiently
important term in the offer.172 ConocoPhillips Alaska (“ConocoPhillips”) contracted to provide
Williams Alaska Petroleum (“Williams”), an oil refinery, with crude oil pursuant to an Exchange
Agreement (“the Agreement”).173 Under the Agreement’s adequate-assurances clause,
ConocoPhillips demanded a payment of $31 million at a set interest rate.174 After a series of
phone calls and letters, Williams wired ConocoPhillips $31 million but demanded credit at a
higher interest rate.175 ConocoPhillips acknowledged receipt of the payment, but did not address
the interest rate issue.176 Williams claims it is owed $5 million from ConocoPhillips as the
difference between the interest rates.177 The trial court granted summary judgment for Williams,
concluding that a contract was formed for the higher interest rate demanded by Williams under
UCC § 2-207(1).178 The supreme court affirmed the superior court, reasoning that the parties
entered into a contract at the higher interest rate because Williams’s reply correspondence
requesting the higher interest rate did not qualify for a “dickered-for” terms exception to § 2207(1).179 The supreme court further reasoned that the negotiations and the behavior of the
parties following negotiations showed that neither party found the open contract terms
sufficiently important to continue negotiating, resulting in a contract under § 2-207(1).180
Affirming the lower court’s summary judgment ruling, the supreme court held that the
“dickered-for” exception to UCC § 2-207(1) contract acceptance only applies when reply
correspondence terms significantly and materially differ from a sufficiently important term in the
offer.181
Girdwood Mining Co. v. Comsult LLC
In Girdwood Mining Co. v. Comsult LLC,182 the supreme court held that an issuer of securities is
not barred by statute from seeking to void an illegal consulting contract.183 Girdwood Mining
Company (“Girdwood”) hired Comsult LLC (“Comsult”) to provide management services and
raise capital.184 When the business relationship went sour, the two companies agreed that
Girdwood would compensate Comsult for services rendered.185 Girdwood then sued Comsult,
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seeking to void the agreement on the ground that it violated Alaska securities law.186 The
superior court granted summary judgment to Comsult, holding the suit barred by a statute
precluding securities suits based on illegal contracts.187 Girdwood appealed.188 The supreme
court reversed, holding Girdwood’s suit was not barred by the statute.189 The court reasoned that
a suit is based on a contract only if it seeks relief on the basis of the contract’s validity. 190 On the
other hand, a suit such as Girdwood’s is not based on a contract if it seeks to void an illegal
contract, because the source of the claim lies in the common-law rules of illegal contracts, not in
the contract itself.191 Reversing the superior court’s decision, the supreme court held that Alaska
securities laws do not preclude an issuer of securities from seeking to void an illegal consulting
contract.192
Pederson v. Artic Slope Regional Corporation
In Pederson v. Artic Slope Regional Corp.,193 the supreme court held that a corporation may
request a confidentiality agreement before granting a shareholder’s document request when the
agreement reasonably defines the scope of confidential information and contains provisions not
unreasonably restrictive based on the shareholder’s purpose and the corporation’s confidentiality
concerns.194 Rodney Pederson, a shareholder of the Artic Slope Regional Corporation, requested
information regarding the corporation’s executive compensation structure.195 In response, the
corporation requested Pederson sign a confidentiality agreement for all information released
applicable to both Pederson and anyone with whom he shared the information.196 The trial court
concluded that the corporation satisfied its statutory obligations by its response to Pederson’s
request for information and that the requested confidentiality agreement was reasonable because
the corporation agreed to nearly all of Pederson’s requests.197 On appeal, Pederson argued that
the trial court erred by interpreting the corporation’s statutory requirements too narrowly and
challenged the reasonableness of the corporation’s confidentiality agreement.198 The supreme
court held that the trial court erred in determining that the statutory requirements of the
corporation’s disclosure did not include electronic information.199 Additionally, the corporation’s
requested confidentiality agreement was unreasonably overbroad based on both its expansive
scope and restrictive breadth of confidentiality protection.200 Reversing the trial court’s findings,
the supreme court held that a corporation may request a confidentiality agreement before
responding to a shareholder’s demand for documents, but the agreement must be reasonable in
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classifying certain information as confidential and the breadth of protection for confidential
information.201

201

Id.

16

CIVIL PROCEDURE
Sagers v. Sackinger
In Sagers v. Sackinger,202 the supreme court held the trial court does not abuse its discretion by
refusing a request for a continuance due to illness when the court determines that the requesting
party is exaggerating the severity of their symptoms and is capable of participating in the trial
without serious risk to his or her well-being.203 In an ongoing child custody case, the father
requested what would have been his seventh continuance, this one due to his ongoing recovery
from pneumonia.204 Although the father provided a physician’s assistant’s testimony in support
of his continuance, the physician’s assistant retracted his own testimony upon learning that the
father had been out biking the day before.205 The trial court denied the father’s request for an
additional continuance.206 On appeal, the father argued that the trial court committed reversible
error in denying his request for a continuance because it ignored his symptoms in court and the
testimony of the physician’s assistant that he was recovering from pneumonia.207 The supreme
court affirmed the lower court, reasoning that it is the task of the trial court to make credibility
determinations.208 The supreme court further reasoned that the court below did not err because
the judge made careful and repeated observations that the father’s symptoms appeared to occur
selectively, and that his demeanor did not suggest a severe illness.209 Affirming the lower court’s
decision, the supreme court held that the trial court does not abuse its discretion by refusing a
request for a continuance due to illness when the court determines that the requesting party is
exaggerating their illness and does not actually require a continuance.210
Conitz v. State, Commission for Human Rights
In Conitz v. State, Commission for Human Rights,211 the supreme court held that an appeal is
moot when the claims pursued on remand would be barred by res judicata.212 In 2006, Conitz
filed complaints with both the Alaska State Commission for Human Rights (“the Commission”)
and the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) for alleged violations in
2004 and 2005.213 Following the EEOC’s decision not to act, Conitz sued the employer in federal
court and the case was dismissed on the merits and affirmed by the Ninth Circuit.214 Prior to the
Ninth Circuit’s affirmance, Conitz filed a second suit in federal court alleging violations in 2007
and 2008.215 While the second suit was pending, the Commission found that Conitz’s claims
were untimely and without merit, and dismissed Conitz’s case.216 Conitz appealed the
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Commission’s decision to the state superior court.217 While this appeal was pending, the federal
district court ruled on Conitz’s second federal suit, finding that res judicata precluded certain
claims and ruling against Conitz on the merits of others.218 The state superior court dismissed
Conitz’s appeal as moot, reasoning that all of his claims had been decided on the merits in his
two federal suits, and thus even if the superior court reversed the Commission’s decision and
remanded the case, the doctrine of res judicata would prevent the Commission from reaching a
different result.219 On appeal, Conitz argued that the doctrine of res judicata did not apply to his
case because the parties were not identical.220 Affirming the lower court, the supreme court
reasoned that the real party in interest is the complainant, not the Commission.221 The court
further reasoned that even if Conitz was not a party, he was in privity with the Commission and
had control over the first case to reach final judgment.222 Affirming the lower court’s decision,
the supreme court held that when a claim is barred by res judicata, an appeal is moot.223
Szabo v. Municipality of Anchorage
In Szabo v. Municipality of Anchorage,224 the supreme court held that a motion for relief from
judgment is not a substitute for a party failing to file a timely, direct appeal to a final judgment
under Alaska Civil Rule 60(b).225 In response to a complaint about a zoning violation against the
Szabos, the Municipality of Anchorage (“Municipality”) sent the Szabos a letter demanding they
comply with the zoning code within 10 days or pay a fine.226 After a series of noncompliance
letters, an enforcement order, and cleanup plans proved unfruitful, the Municipality filed an
action for abatement, injunctive relief, and civil penalties for the full sum of accrued fines.227 The
Szabos counterclaimed and the Municipality moved for summary judgment, which the superior
court granted.228 Having withheld judgment regarding the issue of fines, the court later held an
evidentiary hearing and subsequently issued a supplemental order and final judgment requiring
payment of $226,000 in fines.229 Over a year later, the Szabos filed a motion for relief from
judgment, arguing that under Alaska Civil Rule 60(b)(1) the evidentiary hearing had been an
unfair surprise; under Rule 60(b)(4) the $250 daily fine violated procedural due process; and
under Rule(b)(6) the judgment violated substantive due process.230 The supreme court affirmed
the superior court’s holding that under Rule 60(b)(1) the Szabos’ motion for relief was untimely
because appeals must be entered within a year of judgment.231 The supreme court additionally
reasoned that a procedural due process claim, under Rule 60(b)(4), cannot provide relief in the
absence of a timely appeal due to the interests of finality.232 Lastly, the supreme court
217

Id.
Id.
219
Id. at 505.
220
Id. at 508.
221
Id.
222
Id. at 508–09.
223
Id. at 507–08.
224
320 P.3d 809 (Alaska 2014).
225
Id. at 810.
226
Id.
227
Id.
228
Id. at 811–12.
229
Id. at 812.
230
Id.
231
Id. at 814.
232
Id.
218

18

determined that under Rule 60(b)(6), the Szabos’ failure to make their excessive fines argument
on direct appeal was fatal to the success of a motion for relief.233 Affirming the lower court’s
decision, the supreme court held that, under Rule 60(b), a party failing to make a timely appeal,
particularly in the absence of direct appeal on the final judgment, is not entitled to relief.234
Rude v. Cook Inlet Region, Inc.
In Rude v. Cook Inlet Region, Inc.,235 the supreme court held the superior court does not err by
granting summary judgment for a company when a candidate for the company’s board of
directors makes materially misleading statements in a proxy solicitation that would suggest
improper corporate governance to a reasonable shareholder.236 After being removed from the
board-recommended slate of candidates, Rude, a director on the Cook Inlet Region, Inc.
(“CIRI”) board of directors, sent out a proxy solicitation to CIRI shareholders to gain support for
his re-election.237 Rude’s proxy materials included statements concerning CIRI’s election
procedures, treatment of shareholders, and allegations that CIRI had sold significant
landholdings.238 CIRI then filed suit, alleging that Rude’s statements were misleading.239 The
superior court determined that five statements in Rude’s proxy solicitations were materially
misleading as a matter of law.240 On appeal, Rude argued that his proxy materials contained only
true or aspirational statements.241 The supreme court affirmed, reasoning that Rude’s statements
taken together would give a reasonable shareholder the false impression that CIRI was
liquidating its landholdings and violating shareholders’ rights.242 The court further reasoned that
these misleading statements were material because they would influence a reasonable
shareholder’s decision on how to vote.243 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme
court held that the superior court does not err by granting summary judgment for a company
when a candidate for the company’s board of directors makes materially misleading statements
in a proxy solicitation that would suggest improper corporate governance to a reasonable
shareholder.244
Hawkins v. Attatayuk
In Hawkins v. Attatayuk,245 the supreme court held that Alaska state courts lack subject matter
jurisdiction to adjudicate title issues concerning restricted townsite lots on federal
land.246 Harold Hawkins and Rosalind Attatayuk were married and lived together at a house on a
federally owned townsite lot until Attatayuk moved to Nome in 1981.247 The couple was legally
divorced in 1988, and Hawkins retained the couple’s home—continuing to live on the federally
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owned property thereafter.248 In 1993, Attatayuk sought and was granted a restricted townsite
deed for the property, certifying in her application that the property was not occupied by anyone
other than her, despite knowing that the property had been awarded to Hawkins in the divorce.249
The superior court rejected Hawkins’ argument that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
to decide the ownership dispute, entering a final judgment for Attatayuk and awarding her 18
months back rent and damages.250 On appeal, Hawkins again argued that the superior court had
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate issues concerning restricted township lots.251 The
supreme court reversed the lower court's decision, reasoning that, while Congress conferred
limited jurisdiction to Alaska over some cases concerning townsite lots,252 28 U.S.C. § 1360 did
not confer jurisdiction to states to adjudicate the ownership or right to possession of Alaska
Native townsite property.253
Alsworth v. Seybert
In Alsworth v. Seybert,254 the supreme court held that when granting a preliminary injunction,
courts must consider the injunction’s interference with the defendant notwithstanding any
alleged illegality of the defendant’s actions.255 Seybert and several other registered Borough
voters brought suit against Alsworth and Anelon, two members of the Borough Assembly, for
violating local and state conflict of interest laws and common law doctrine by participating in
Assembly decisions from which they benefit directly.256 Seybert also sought a preliminary
injunction enjoining Alsworth and Anelon from, among many things, speaking in favor of
Alaska’s Pebble Mine and failing to declare conflicts of interest on related matters before the
Borough Assembly.257 The superior court applied the balance of hardships standard, holding that
the balance of hardships weighed heavily in favor of granting the injunction because the
injunction would require the defendants to comply with the law.258 On appeal, Alsworth and
Anelon argued that the superior court erred in applying the balance of hardships standard
because there is no threat of irreparable harm and they were not adequately protected under the
injunction.259 The supreme court reversed the lower court's decision,260 reasoning that it is
improper to consider an injunction’s harm to defendants under the assumption that the enjoined
actions will ultimately be found to be illegal.261 The proper inquiry is not whether the injunction
merely orders a defendant to comply with the law, but instead whether, assuming the defendant
will ultimately prevail, the injury which will result from the injunction can be indemnified by a
bond or is relatively slight in comparison to the injury which the person seeking the injunction
will suffer if the injunction is not granted.262 Reversing the lower court's decision,263 the supreme
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court held that when granting a preliminary injunction, courts must consider the injunction’s
interference with the defendant notwithstanding any alleged illegality of the defendant’s
actions.264
In re Mark V.
In In re Mark V.,265 the supreme court held the collateral consequences exception to the
mootness doctrine does not allow appellate review of an involuntary civil commitment when the
committee has had several recent civil commitments and there is no evidence of a procedural
defect in the commitment hearing.266 The superior court ordered Mark V. committed to the
Alaska Psychiatric Institute for thirty days after he exhibited bizarre behavior.267 Mark had a
history of mental illness and had been committed at least four times recently. 268 Mark appealed,
but because he had been released by the time of his appeal, his claim was technically moot.269
But Mark argued that the collateral consequences exception permitted appellate review of his
moot claim.270 The supreme court rejected Mark’s collateral consequences claim, reasoning that
Mark’s four recent commitments made it highly unlikely that his latest commitment created any
additional adverse consequences, that the mere possibility of collateral consequences from the
latest commitment was not sufficient to justify appellate review, that there were no procedural
defects in the commitment hearing, and that Mark’s interests were safeguarded by a state law
that allowed courts to expunge or seal records relating to civil commitment.271 Rejecting Mark’s
appeal, the supreme court held the collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine
does not allow appellate review of an involuntary civil commitment when the committee has had
several recent civil commitments and there is no evidence of a procedural defect in the
commitment hearing.272
Patterson v. Cox
In Patterson v. Cox,273 the supreme court held that the failure to issue an order to show cause or a
bench warrant in response to a motion to enforce a subpoena constitutes judicial error.274
Patterson’s SUV was struck from behind when he braked to avoid a stalled car in his lane.275 He
filed suit against Cox, the driver of the stalled car, and Ford Motor Company. 276 During the trial,
Patterson sought to have Cox testify but she ignored the subpoena and never appeared. 277
Patterson approved of the court’s suggestion to have her arrested, and was frustrated when the
court decided not to issue a bench warrant.278 Instead, the court gave a curative jury instruction,
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allowing the jury to consider Cox’s absence as favorable evidence for Patterson.279 The jury
returned a verdict against Patterson.280 On appeal of the lower court’s decision, Patterson argued
that the superior court should have issued a bench warrant to compel Cox to appear at trial and
that the failure to do so was prejudicial.281 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s
decision, reasoning that pro se litigants warranted relaxed procedural requirements.282 The court
further reasoned that the court should have treated Patterson’s approval of its suggestion to arrest
Cox as a proper motion to invoke the court’s contempt power and enforce Cox’s subpoena.283
Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that in light of a motion to enforce a
subpoena, a court’s failure to issue an order to show cause or a bench warrant constitutes judicial
error.284
BP Pipelines, Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Revenue
In BP Pipelines, Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Revenue,285 the supreme court held that the superior court
did not err in awarding attorneys’ fees in an appeal in the form of a trial de novo pursuant to
Civil Rules 82 and 79 instead of Appellate Rule 508.286 Following initial trial de novo in superior
court over the valuation of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System for taxation purposes, the State
Department and municipalities asserted their status as the prevailing party for collection of
attorneys’ fees under the Civil Rules.287 The superior court agreed that the State Department and
municipalities were prevailing parties over BP and the other owners of the pipeline, and
calculated their attorneys’ fee awards under the Civil Rules 82 and 79.288 On appeal, BP and the
other owners of the pipeline argued that the superior court had erred in applying the Civil Rules
because the proceeding was an appeal from an administrative board’s decision, and the fact that
it occurred in superior court should not mean that the Civil Rules apply.289 The supreme court
affirmed the lower court’s decision,290 reasoning that the superior court did not err in applying
the Civil Rules to calculate attorneys’ fees because the Appellate Rules specify that in a trial de
novo during an appeal from an administrative agency, the rules for procedure in the superior
court should be followed.291 The supreme court further reasoned that Civil Rule 82, upon which
the superior court’s attorneys’ fees calculation relied, had been designated a rule of procedure by
prior supreme court precedent.292 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held
that the superior court did not err in calculating attorneys’ fees of the prevailing party under the
Civil Rules in an administrative appeal that took the form of a trial de novo.293
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Lane v. Ballot
In Lane v. Ballot,294 the supreme court held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars a
defendant from relitigating the facts which form the basis of a jury verdict of “guilty but
mentally ill” in a criminal case.295 Annie Ballot filed a civil suit against Lennie Lane that alleged
Lane severely beat and raped Ballot.296 The complaint further alleged that Lane was criminally
responsible for his actions.297 The trial court granted Ballot’s motion for summary judgment after
defense counsel stipulated to the defendant’s conviction for rape and assault on the grounds
collateral estoppel barred relitigation of the facts which formed the basis for the conviction. 298
On appeal, Lane argued that the conviction of “guilty but mentally ill” was not subject to the
doctrine of collateral estoppel and therefore the trial court improperly granted summary
judgment.299 By finding Lane “guilty but mentally ill” the jury concluded beyond a reasonable
doubt that Lane knew or should have known he was beating and raping another person, even if
he did not know that his actions were wrongful.300 This conviction was sufficient to satisfy the
elements of a number of different tort causes of action, including assault and battery and civil
rape.301 Affirming the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, the supreme court held that a
verdict of “guilty but mentally ill” has the same collateral estoppel effect as any other guilty
verdict and therefore bars the defendant from relitigating the facts that formed the basis for the
conviction on the issue of civil liability.302
Heber v. Heber
In Heber v. Heber,303 the supreme court held that an inconsistency between an ex-spouse’s
statement in a dissolution petition and an ex-spouse’s testimony at a custody hearing does not
void a child custody modification judgment as based on fraud, misrepresentation, or
misconduct.304 Todd and Tamara Heber filed a petition to dissolve their marriage that stipulated
that no domestic violence occurred during the marriage.305 Months after the superior court
granted the petition, Tamara testified at a custody modification hearing that Todd had engaged in
domestic violence several times during their marriage, and as a result the judge awarded custody
of the child to Tamara.306 Todd moved to set aside the custody modification under Rule 60(b)(3),
arguing Tamara engaged in misrepresentation when she testified that Todd had assaulted her.307
The supreme court affirmed, holding Tamara’s testimony at the custody hearing was not a
misrepresentation.308 The court reasoned that the contradiction between the dissolution petition
and Tamara’s testimony at trial did not demonstrate that the testimony constituted
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misrepresentation, because it was just as likely that the dissolution petition was inaccurate.309
The inconsistency spoke to Tamara’s credibility rather than establishing that she committed
fraud at trial.310 In addition, the court argued that some unfairness here was excusable because
the goal in the custody modification context is simply to promote the best interests of children.311
Affirming the superior court’s decision, the supreme court held an inconsistency between an exspouse’s statement in a dissolution petition and an ex-spouse’s testimony at a custody hearing
does not void the resulting child custody modification judgment as based on fraud,
misrepresentation, or misconduct.312
McCormick v. Chippewa, Inc.
In McCormick v. Chippewa, Inc.313, the supreme court held that it is an abuse of a court’s
discretion not to allow a party to conduct discovery before ruling on a summary judgment
motion.314 McCormick was injured while employed by Chippewa, Inc. (“Chippewa”) and later
filed suit against the company.315 The parties settled, but were found to be in disagreement over
the meaning of the settlement.316 McCormick filed suit once more.317 McCormick sought to
conduct discovery, and requested additional time to do so under Rule 56(f), while Chippewa
filed a motion to dismiss that was converted by the lower court into a motion for summary
judgment.318 The lower court denied McCormick’s Rule 56(f) motion requesting time for
discovery, denied the reconsideration of it as moot, and granted summary judgment to
Chippewa.319 On appeal, McCormick argued the lower court had abused its discretion by
granting summary judgment to Chippewa without allowing him to conduct discovery by granting
him more time under Rule 56(f).320 The supreme court vacated the lower court's decision,
reasoning that litigants have a right to pre-trial discovery, and that it is particularly important
when a person faces summary judgment.321 Further, the supreme court noted that Rule 56(f)
exists to protect a party from a premature summary judgment, and that requests for continuances
under it should normally be granted.322 Vacating the lower court's decision, the supreme court
held that a court abuses its discretion by denying a party the opportunity to conduct discovery
before ruling on a summary judgment motion.323
Moffitt v. Moffitt
In Moffitt v. Moffitt,324 the supreme court held that the defense of laches, not a statute of
limitations, applies to an equitable claim for relief from a contract.325 In 1998, Leonard and Betty
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Moffitt signed a contract agreeing that (upon their deaths) the entirety of their family farm
property would be sold to their son, Tracy Moffitt, and his wife Kathy Moffitt.326 In 2005,
Leonard and Betty’s personal representative, their daughter Linda Moffitt, brought a civil suit
against Tracy and Kathy seeking damages and rescission of the contract.327 The superior court
dismissed Linda’s equitable claims on summary judgment because the statute of limitations had
run before she filed the suit on behalf of Leonard and Betty Moffitt.328 On appeal, Linda argued
that the statute of limitations did not apply to her equitable claims.329 The supreme court agreed,
and reversed the lower court’s decision.330 The supreme court reasoned that although a statute of
limitations cannot apply to equitable remedies, the doctrine of laches controls instead.331
Reversing the summary judgment and remanding to the lower court for further factual
determinations, the supreme court held that the doctrine of laches applies to any equitable claim,
and a statute of limitations cannot.332
Nautilus Marine Enterprises, Inc. v. Exxon Mobil Corp.
In Nautilus Marine Enterprises, Inc. v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,333 the supreme court held that an
award of attorneys’ fees should be based on local rates absent extraordinary circumstances.334 In
a declaratory judgment proceeding, the superior court interpreted a settlement agreement
between Nautilus and Exxon related to the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill and decided that Exxon
was the prevailing party as a result of misconduct by Nautilus’s president.335 As a result, Exxon
motioned for attorneys’ fees, and the superior court determined that Exxon’s retention of
O’Melveny & Meyers was reasonable and awarding fees for the firm based on its Los Angeles
billing rates.336 On appeal, Nautilus argued that the court should have adopted locality rule for
attorneys fees, under which trial courts are required to award reimbursement based on the fees
customarily charged in the locality of the case, as opposed to the more lenient reasonableness
test.337 The supreme court reversed the lower court's decision and adopted the locality rule,
reasoning that to allow otherwise would deter Alaskans from seeking redress in the courts for
bona fide disputes, particularly in light of how common attorneys’ fee awards are in the state.338
The supreme court further determined that departure from this general rule may be allowed, but
only in extraordinary circumstances, such as when counsel with the necessary expertise or
willingness to take one’s case is not locally available.339 Reversing the lower court's decision, the
supreme court held that an award of attorneys’ fees should be based on local rates absent
extraordinary circumstances.340
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In re Vernon H.
In In re Vernon H.,341 the supreme court held that ordinary civil rule of fee shifting rules do not
apply in guardianship proceedings.342 This case arose after Vernon H., an elderly man born in
1928, was hospitalized for medical testing and treatment for cancer.343 Concerned with the
management of Vernon’s treatment and finances, and claiming Vernon was incapacitated, his
son filed petitions for guardianship.344 Vernon retained an attorney, moved to dismiss the
petitions, and secured an expert doctor who concluded that Vernon was competent.345 The son
subsequently withdrew his petitions, and Vernon moved for full attorneys’ fees and for costs
related to the doctor’s report.346 Currently, the statutory scheme for fee shifting in guardianship
cases requires that the petitioner initiated a proceeding that was malicious, frivolous, or without
just cause.347 The superior court denied the motion for attorney’s fees and costs, holding that the
son did not initiate the proceedings maliciously, frivolously, or without, and further holding that
Vernon was not entitled to attorney’s fees and costs under the separate civil rule.348 On appeal,
Vernon argued that the civil rule providing for attorney’s fees and costs to the prevailing party
applied to his proceeding.349 The supreme court affirmed the superior court’s decision,
reasoning that the civil rule did not apply where other statutory schemes existed.350 The court
further reasoned that the application of the civil rule would impermissibly interfere with the
unique character and purpose of guardianship proceedings.351 Affirming the superior court’s
decision, the supreme court held that the civil rule which awards attorney’s fees and costs to a
prevailing party does not apply in guardianship proceedings.352
Osborne v. State, Dep’t of Corrections
In Osborne v. State, Dep’t of Corrections,353 the supreme court held Department of Corrections
(DOC) grievance decisions alleging violations of fundamental constitutional rights are not
subject to review by the superior court.354 Osborne filed a prisoner grievance with the DOC
alleging that the DOC violated his constitutional rights by incorrectly calculating his sentence.355
After the DOC denied his grievance, he appealed the decision to the superior court, which
dismissed the appeal on the ground that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.356 Osborne
then appealed to the supreme court, arguing that DOC grievance decisions involving
constitutional rights can be reviewed by the superior court where, as here, the DOC
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determinations were adjudicative and produced a factual record capable of appellate review.357
The supreme court affirmed, holding that the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
review DOC decisions because they were insufficiently adjudicative and did not produce a
record capable of appellate review.358 The court reasoned that DOC decisions lacked the
hallmarks of adjudication, such as adverse presentation of facts and examination of witnesses,
and that DOC decisions did not result in a factual record that could be reviewed on appeal.359
Moreover, Osborne could have contested his sentence by an original application for postconviction relief.360 Affirming the superior court’s decision, the supreme court held that DOC
grievance decisions alleging violations of fundamental constitutional rights are not subject to
review by the superior court.361
Kunuk v. State, Dep’t of Natural Resources
In Kunuk v. State, Dep’t of Natural Resources,362 the supreme court held that it could not declare
that the State has specific obligations to its inhabitants to reduce carbon dioxide emissions
because such claims involve non-justiciable political questions.363 Plaintiffs in the case were six
Alaskan children, including Kunuk, who filed suit against the State for failing to protect the
atmosphere from the effects of climate change and secure a future for Alaska’s children.364
Kunuk argued that such failure breached the State’s public trust obligations under article VIII of
the Alaska Constitution, and that the State has failed it’s affirmative fiduciary obligation to
protect and preserve the atmosphere.365 The State moved to dismiss the complaint.366 The
superior court held that all the claims made in the complaint were non-justiciable political
questions and granted the State’s motion to dismiss.367 On appeal, Kunuk argued the superior
court erred in its dismissing the claims.368 The supreme court affirmed the lower court's
decision, reasoning that although some of Kunuk’s claims did not fall under the political
question doctrine, they nonetheless should have been dismissed on prudential grounds.369 In
light of the court’s inability to determine what the state’s obligations would entail, declaring that
the atmosphere is a public trust resource that the State has failed to protect would not
significantly advance the goals of declaratory relief, which is to afford relief from the
controversy giving rise to the proceeding.370 Affirming the lower court's decision, the supreme
court held that it could not declare the State has specific obligations to its inhabitants to reduce
carbon dioxide emissions because such claims involve non-justiciable political questions.371
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Christensen v. Alaska Sales & Service, Inc.
In Christensen v. Alaska Sales & Service, Inc.,372 the supreme court held that in order to defeat a
motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party need only establish that a material issue of
fact exists, but the non-moving party does not need to demonstrate that she will ultimately
prevail in the matter.373 Christensen was in a car accident while driving a car purchased from
Alaska Sales & Service; she suffered injuries to her head that resulted in ongoing issues with her
speech, memory, and mobility.374 After the accident, she took the Buick for repairs, where the
shop identified that the seatbelt had been working properly.375 Christensen eventually filed suit
against Alaska Sales & Service because of the faulty seatbelts.376 After discovery, the trial court
granted Alaska Sales & Service’s motion for summary judgment.377 On appeal, Alaska Sales &
Service argued that the correct summary judgment test required that a jury could find in the nonmoving party’s favor.378 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that the
lower court had applied the incorrect summary judgment standard.379 The supreme court
reasoned that the actual test for summary judgment was not contingent on a judge deciding
whether a jury could find for the non-moving party.380 Rather, summary judgment motions
should be decided for the non-moving party when there is a material issue of fact.381 Moreover,
that standard is only a reasonableness standard, dependent on more than unsupported
assumptions but only such that a reasonable person could make inferences from the evidence
presented in favor of the non-moving party.382 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s
decision, reasoning that the lower court had applied the wrong standard for summary judgment
and clarifying that to survive a summary judgment motion, the non-moving party need
demonstrate only an issue of material fact.383
State v. Leighton
In State v. Leighton,384 the court of appeals held that the Alaska Constitution does not require
grand juries to be instructed that they have absolute discretion in refusing to return an indictment,
where the State has produced the sufficient evidence to warrant an indictment.385 Leighton was
indicted on five counts of sexual abuse after the presiding judge instructed the grand jury that if
the evidence satisfied the requisite standard, then the indictment “should” be endorsed a true
bill.386 Leighton moved to dismiss her indictment, arguing that the grand jury should have been
informed of their unfettered discretion to refuse a proposed indictment.387 The lower court found
that the use of the word “should” instead of “may” in the grand jury instruction did not properly
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reflect the absolute discretion awarded to the jury under the Alaska Constitution.388 On petition
for review, the court of appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that the lower
court’s decision was based on an incorrect interpretation of the Alaska Constitution.389 The court
of appeals found that the language in the constitution stating that the grand jury may return an
indictment does not establish a legal test for when an indictment may be endorsed.390 Further, the
court of appeals reasoned that the word “may,” as well as the word “should,” does not refer to a
grand jury’s absolute discretion to refuse to return an indictment, but rather authorizes the grand
jury to return an indictment based on sufficient evidence.391 Reversing the lower court’s
decision, the court of appeals held that grand jurors do not have absolute discretion to refuse to
return an indictment and that the superior court did not err in instructing the jurors that they
“should” return an indictment if sufficient evidence has been presented.392
Asa’carsarmiut Tribal Council v. Wheeler
In Asa’carsarmiut Tribal Council v. Wheeler,393 the supreme court held a tribal council lacks
standing to appeal a custody modification order from which neither parent appeals.394 Jeanette
Myre, a member of the Asa’carsarmiut Tribe, had a son, J.W., with John Wheeler, who is not a
member of the tribe.395 In 2007, the Asa’carsarmiut Tribal Court awarded custody of J.W. to
Myre.396 In 2012, after Myre was arrested for child endangerment, Wheeler filed a motion for
modification of the custody order in superior court.397 The superior court, after allowing the
tribal council to intervene to argue that the court lacked jurisdiction, determined that it had
jurisdiction and granted custody to Wheeler.398 Neither parent appealed this order, but the tribal
council appealed on the ground that the superior court lacked jurisdiction.399 The supreme court
dismissed the appeal, holding that the tribal council lacked standing to appeal the custody
order.400 The court reasoned that the tribal council cited no precedent to support its argument that
it had an interest in vindicating its sovereign authority by appealing a denial of a custody order
from which neither parent appealed.401 The court emphasized that neither parent contested the
superior court’s order, suggesting a lack of a real case or controversy between involved
parties.402 Dismissing the tribal council’s appeal, the supreme court held a tribal council lacks
standing to appeal a custody modification order from which neither parent appeals. 403
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
In re Daniel G.
In In re Daniel G.,404 the supreme court held an ex parte order authorizing a 72-hour psychiatric
evaluation period following an individual’s emergency detention does not violate due process
because the statutory framework is appropriately protective of the individual’s liberty interests
without prolonging the emergency detention.405 Daniel was detained by a police officer and
transported to a psychiatric hospital after threatening suicide.406 Daniel did not contest the
validity of the initial detention.407 Later that day, a magistrate judge issued an order authorizing a
72-hour evaluation period based on sworn allegations from medical personnel that Daniel was
actively suicidal and likely to cause serious harm to himself.408 The next day, Daniel filed a
motion to vacate the order, arguing that the ex parte order violated due process because it lacked
emergency justification.409 On the same day that Daniel filed the motion, he was discharged from
the hospital when the medical staff determined that he did not meet the requirements for
commitment under AS 47.30.700.410 Daniel appealed the trial court’s denial of the motion to
vacate as moot on due process grounds.411 Although the appeal was technically moot, the
supreme court found that the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine applied and
concluded that the 72-hour evaluation order and evaluation procedures did not violate due
process.412 The court adopted the State’s argument that an expedited ex parte order was more
likely to lead to a prompt release when an individual does not meet commitment standards rather
than a contested hearing with counsel.413 Affirming the lower courts decision while remanding
the case for correction of the title of the order issued, the supreme court held that the statutory
requirements for an expeditious psychiatric evaluation by an ex parte order do not violate due
process.414
State v. Schmidt
In State v. Schmidt,415 the supreme court held a municipal property tax exemption for senior
citizens and disabled veterans that denies the full value of the exemption to same-sex couples
violates the state’s equal protection clause.416 By statute, Alaska grants a $150,000 property tax
exemption for a home owned and occupied by a senior citizen or a disabled veteran.417 If the
eligible person and her spouse live in the same residence, the exemption applies in full regardless
of who holds title to the property.418 However, if someone other than the eligible person’s spouse
lives in the home, the exemption applies only to the portion of the home occupied by the eligible
404
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person.419 Three same-sex couples in committed, long-term relationships tried to obtain the
exemption, but were denied the full value of the exemption because they were unable to marry
under Alaska law.420 They then sued the State of Alaska and the Municipality of Anchorage,
arguing that the statute was unconstitutional.421 The trial court granted summary judgment for the
couples, holding the tax exemption unconstitutional.422 The State and Municipality appealed,
arguing that the statute was constitutional because it was not facially discriminatory and samesex couples were not similarly situated to married couples.423 The supreme court affirmed on this
issue, holding the tax exemption violated the equal protection clause.424 The court reasoned that
the statute facially discriminated against same-sex couples because it denied the full exemption
to unmarried couples, and same-sex couples cannot get married under Alaska law.425 The court
held that even under minimum scrutiny, the exemption violated the equal protection clause
because there was no substantial relationship between the state’s goals (administrative efficiency,
promoting marriage, and cost control) and the statute.426 Affirming the superior court’s decision
in part, the supreme court held a municipal property tax exemption for senior citizens and
disabled veterans that denies the full value of the exemption to same-sex couples violates the
state’s equal protection clause.427
Tweedy v. Matanuska–Susitna Borough Board of Adjustment and Appeals
In Tweedy v. Matanuska–Susitna Borough Board of Adjustment and Appeals,428 the supreme
court held that a setback requirement as applied to a recently constructed addition to a home to
which the requirement applies does not violate substantive due process or constitute a taking.429
Tweedy build an addition to the lake house he leased, and later applied to purchase the house.430
Because the house was less than 75 feet from the shoreline, the sale required an exemption from
the Borough’s setback requirement.431 The Borough Planning Director determined the addition
was unlawful and required removal before processing the sale.432 The lower court affirmed the
Planning Director’s decision because the 75 foot setback applied to Tweedy’s property when he
constructed the addition, and thus he was not entitled to an exemption, and the ordinance does
not violate substantive due process because it is reasonably related to a legitimate government
purpose.433 On appeal, Tweedy argued the setback requirement was improperly applied
retroactively to his addition, thus violating substantive due process or constituted and
unconstitutional taking.434 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that
the setback requirement was properly applied to his addition and thus the addition was unlawful
419

Id.
Id. at 653.
421
Id. at 654.
422
Id.
423
Id.
424
Id. at 669.
425
Id. at 659.
426
Id. at 663–64.
427
Id. at 651.
428
332 P.3d 12 (Alaska 2014).
429
Id. at 12.
430
Id. at 13.
431
Id.
432
Id.
433
Id. at 15–16.
434
Id. at 16.
420

31

when built; thus, there was no takings or due process violation.435 The setback provision was in
place when Tweedy took possession of the property and because the code allows for
nonconforming structures, the setback provision did not deprive Tweedy of any right or property
interest and thus is constitutional.436 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held
that a setback requirement as applied to an addition built after the setback requirement was put in
place is constitutional because it does not violate the property owner’s substantive due process
rights or constitute a taking.437
Lake and Peninsula Borough Assembly v. Oberlatz
In Lake and Peninsula Borough Assembly v. Oberlatz,438 the supreme court held when a voter
brings an action concerning a right that finds its source under the United States Constitution or
the Constitution of the State of Alaska a constitutional claim has been made.439 Several
individuals maintained houses both inside the Lake and Peninsula Borough (“The Borough”) and
outside the Borough.440 When the individuals voted their votes were disqualified because it was
determined that they were not residents of the Borough.441 The superior court found the
individuals were residents of the Borough, however, the court found that they were not entitled
to full attorneys’ fees as allowed allows when bringing a constitutional claim, because the basic
right to vote was never a questioned.442 The superior court stated that because it was a voter
residency requirement conferred by statute it was a conclusion of statutory law, not a
constitutional case.443 The supreme court stated that in determining whether something is a
constitutional claim courts must look at the source of the right asserted not at the source of the
rule of law.444 The right to vote is derived from the Alaska Constitution and the statutory voter
registration requirements limit the right, but they do not create it.445 The supreme court held
when a voter brings an action concerning a right that finds its source under the United States
Constitution or the Constitution of the State of Alaska a constitutional claim has been made.
Harris v. Millenium Hotel
In Harris v. Millenium Hotel,446 the supreme court held neither constitutionally- nor statutorilydefined distinctions between same-sex and heterosexual married couples preclude an equal
protection challenge.447 Harris filed a worker’s compensation claim as her deceased, same-sex
partner’s “dependent/spouse” and Millenium, the employer, denied the benefit on the grounds
that Harris was not a documented spouse.448 On appeal to the Alaska Worker’s Compensation
Board (“Board”), Harris challenged the denial on equal protection grounds, arguing the marriage
requirement under both Alaska’s Marriage Amendment and the Worker’s Compensation Act was
435
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facially discriminatory towards a same-sex couple that could not legally marry in the
state.449 The Board declined to address the constitutional issues and so Harris appealed to the
Alaska Worker’s Compensation Appeals Commission, reasserting her equal protection claim.450
The Commission affirmed the Board’s reasoning that Harris was not entitled to death benefits
because she did not qualify as a widow or widower under the Worker’s Compensation Act.451 On
appeal from that decision, the supreme court reasoned the Marriage Amendment does not
prohibit the State from offering the same benefits to same-sex and heterosexual couples.452
Additionally, granting a benefit only to spouses was facially discriminatory453 and, furthermore,
heterosexual married couples are similarly situated to unmarried but committed same-sex
couples.454 Vacating the Commission’s denial and remanding the case for a factual inquiry into
whether Harris was essentially her partner’s spouse at the time of death, the supreme court held
denying same-sex couples access to death benefits under the Worker’s Compensation Act could
constitute a violation of equal protection.455
Alaska Judicial Council v. Kruse
In Alaska Judicial Council v. Kruse,456 the supreme court held that the Alaska Judicial Council
(“the Council”) may disseminate information recarding judicial candidates, regardless of the
proximity to the election. In 2010, the Council recommended that the electorate refrain from
retaining a currently presiding district court judge.457 Voters challenged the constitutionality of
the statute empowering the Council to make such recommendations.458 The lower court held that
the statute is constitutional, but enjoined the Council from releasing new information regarding
the judge within sixty days of the election.459 On appeal, the Council argued that no limitations
prohibiting the release of information in the sixty days before an election exist in the statute’s
plain language, and the legislature’s primary objective for the statute was increasing the
availability of information for voters to become informed.460 The supreme court reversed the
lower court, reasoning that the plain meaning of the statute and legislative history permit the
Council to provide information to the public regarding elections within sixty days of the
election.461 The statute does not discuss the time frame in which information should be
published, and longstanding practice indicates that the legislature interprets the statute as
permitting the Council to provide the public with additional information within sixty days of
elections.462 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that the statute is
constitutional and does not limit the Council’s dissemination of new information, including
within sixty days of an election.463
449
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Siedentop v. State
In Siedentop v. State,464 the court of appeals held that a police officer sticking his foot across the
threshold of a door to keep it from closing constitutes an entry for Fourth Amendment
purposes.465 On September 23, 2010, five police officers approached a residence in Fairbanks
looking to serve an arrest warrant on a third party.466 Siedentop opened the door of the house,
and one of the officers put his foot across the threshold to keep the door from being closed again
by Siedentop.467 After noticing suspicious behavior by Siedentop, the officers asked if he had
weapons on him.468 Siedentop admitted he did, and two subsequent searches of his person
discovered a hunting knife, a handgun, an extra magazine for the handgun, approximately $2000
in cash, powder cocaine, crack cocaine, and a digital scale.469 The court of appeals reversed the
lower court, noting that the Fourth Amendment draws a firm line at the entrance to the house,
and that police may not cross the threshold of a home without a warrant.470 Placing a foot across
the threshold of the house to prevent Siedentop from closing the door was a violation of the
Fourth Amendment.471 The evidence against Siedentop was the fruit of an unlawful seizure, and
the superior court should have suppressed it.472 The court of appeal reversed the judgment of the
superior court, holding that a foot across the threshold of a home was an entry for Fourth
Amendment purposes.473
State v. Finley
In State v. Finley,474 the court of appeals held that a witness is entitled to transactional immunity
from criminal prosecution by the State of Alaska, but a witness is only entitled to use immunity
from criminal prosecution in other American jurisdictions.475 Finley was accused and charged for
the delivery of heroin and Dickson was called to testify.476 Dickson asserted his constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination and the State granted Dickson transactional (i.e. complete)
immunity from prosecution by the State of Alaska for any crimes relating to his testimony.477
The trial court agreed with Dickson’s argument that the Alaska constitution required that
Dickson receive transactional immunity from the federal government.478 The trial court reasoned
that compelling Dickson’s testimony would violate the Alaska Constitution if the testimony
subjected Dickson to prosecution in another jurisdiction.479 Reversing the decision of the trial
court, the court of appeals held that a witness who receives a grant of immunity after refusing to
testify is entitled to protection from prosecution in other jurisdictions, but the protection
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extended to other jurisdictions is not absolute.480 The court of appeals reasoned that a grant of
transactional immunity in the state and use immunity in other jurisdictions strikes the balance
between protecting against self-incrimination and accommodating the interests of outside
jurisdictions.481 Thus, the court of appeals held that the Alaska Constitution requires that a
compelled witness receive transactional immunity from prosecution for any violations of state
criminal law, while the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United State Constitution
require only that the witness receive use immunity for their testimony.482
Brewer v. State
In Brewer v. State483, the supreme court held that the State is not automatically made immune to
claims under Alaska’s Takings Clause merely by the valid exercise its police powers, such as by
firefighting.484 In 2009, the Railbelt Complex wildfires engulfed 600,000 acres of the Alaska
interior.485 Firefighters acting under State authority set “burnout” fires on the properties of
several landowners (the “Landowners”) in order to deprive the oncoming Railbelt Complex fires
of fuel.486 The tactic was successful, and structures on the Landowners’ properties escaped
unharmed.487 The Landowners filed suit against the State in 2010, claiming among other things
that they were owed just compensation for the property the State had burned under Alaska’s
Takings Clause.488 The lower court granted summary judgment to the State, finding that the
property had been burned as a valid exercise of the State’s police powers and was thus not
compensable.489 On appeal, the Landowners argued that their land had been burned for public
use, which would qualify it as a taking.490 The supreme court reversed the lower court's
decision, reasoning that a valid exercise of the State’s police power is sufficient to prove action
taken for public benefit.491 Further, the court reasoned that when a taking has occurred, it is noncompensable only if the State can show that it acted under the doctrine of necessity.492 As no
such finding of necessity had been made in the lower court, the supreme court remanded the case
for further consideration on the issue.493 Reversing the lower court's decision, the supreme court
held that the State is not automatically immune from Takings Clause claims simply by showing
that it validly exercised its police powers.494
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CONTRACT LAW
Zamarello v. Reges
In Zamarello v. Reges,495 the supreme court held a new trial is not granted when evidence exists
supporting the jury’s conclusions and an attorney’s negligence results in no impact on the
outcome of the case.496 The parties, an attorney and client, disagreed regarding the subjective
understanding of a fee agreement and who should receive what amount of money following a
litigation settlement.497 The client brought an action against his attorney for breach of contract,
breach of fiduciary duty, misrepresentation, and negligence.498 The lower court found the
attorney did not breach a contract, did not breach fiduciary duties, and did not make a
misrepresentation.499 Although the lower court also found the attorney was negligent, the
negligence caused the client no damage.500 On appeal, the client argued that the lower court erred
by issuing incorrect jury instructions regarding contract interpretation for the fee arrangement
and by denying the client’s motion for a new trial or judgment not withstanding the verdict.501
The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that the jury instructions were
harmless because it was unclear which party drafted the contract, and not prejudicial to the client
and sufficient evidence existed to find for the lawyer on each claim.502 The error likely did not
affect jurors’ judgment and the evidence supporting the trial court’s decision to deny a new trial
was not lacking or unconvincing, thus rendering a new trial inappropriate.503 Affirming the lower
court’s decision, the supreme court held that a new trial is not appropriate when evidence
substantiates the jury’s decisions and the attorney’s negligence is harmless.504
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CRIMINAL LAW
Patterson v. State
In Patterson v. State,505 the court of appeals held that registered sex offenders are required to
disclose all email addresses at their annual or quarterly verifications, including those established
before the email disclosure requirement went into effect.506 Patterson, because of multiple
convictions, was required to register as a sex offender continuously for life and to file quarterly
verifications with the Department of Public Safety.507 Since January 1, 2009, Patterson had also
been required to disclose all email addresses.508 Patterson was charged with second-degree
failure to register as a sex offender when it was discovered that he had email addresses that had
not been disclosed in his quarterly verifications.509 His motion to dismiss was denied.510 On
appeal, Patterson argued that he was required only to disclose email addresses established or
changed after the email disclosure requirement went into effect.511 The court of appeals affirmed
the lower court’s decision, reasoning that uncodified sections of the statute made clear that the
Legislature intended for sex offenders to disclose every email address.512 The court further
reasoned that Patterson was aware of the requirement to disclose emails established before 2009,
and in fact did disclose a different preexisting email address.513 Affirming the lower court’s
decision, the court of appeals held that sex offenders who registered prior to the email disclosure
requirement must report all of their email addresses at their first annual or quarterly
verification.514
Johnson v. State
In Johnson v. State,515 the supreme court held that an unpreserved double-jeopardy claim is a
claim of fundamental error that warrants full appellate review on the merits.516 Johnson, who was
convicted of two counts of first-degree sexual assault, kidnapping, and third degree assault,
argued that his two sexual assault convictions should be merged into a single conviction as per
the constitutional prohibition on double jeopardy.517 The court of appeals held that Johnson
forfeited his double-jeopardy argument because he did not raise it in superior court, and the
superior court did not commit error by failing to merge the sexual assault counts sua sponte. 518
On appeal, Johnson argued that the court of appeals erred in denying his late-raised doublejeopardy argument full appellate review on the merits.519 The Supreme Court reversed in part
and affirmed in part, reasoning that a claim of a double jeopardy violation, even if not raised in
trial court, may be raised for the first time on appeal and given full appellate consideration on the
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merits because if meritorious, the error would qualify as fundamental.520 Fundamental errors are
exempt from the general preservation rule, and double-jeopardy is a “bulwark” of the criminal
justice system.521 Reversing the lower court’s decision in part, the supreme court held that double
jeopardy claims are claims of fundamental error that may unconditionally be raised for the first
time on appeal and reviewed on the merits.522
Roth v. State
In Roth v. State,523 the court of appeals held that a trial court judge’s erroneous jury instruction
does not create cognizable grounds for appeal of a conviction when the defendant consented to
the judge’s erroneous instruction.524 Robert Roth Jr. was tried and convicted of two counts of
first-degree child endangerment for leaving his children with a person Roth knew was under a
duty to register as a sex offender.525 At trial, Roth argued his actions did not satisfy the statutory
requirements of child endangerment because other adults were in the home with the children and
the registered sex offender.526 During deliberations, the jury asked the trial court to clarify what
it meant to “leave” a child with another person pursuant to the statute.527 After securing the
agreement of the prosecutor and defense counsel as to the proposed clarification, the trial judge
instructed the jury to “use reason and common sense” in determining the meaning of the
statute.528 Soon after, the jury returned with a guilty verdict.529 On appeal, Roth argued that
statute requires proof that the children were left solely with the registered sex offender and that
the presence of non-sex offender individuals in the home meant that Roth was not guilty as a
matter of law.530 While finding that the trial judge’s response to the jury was plainly erroneous,
the court of appeals held that Roth’s appeal failed because defense counsel encouraged the trial
judge to give the erroneous instruction and therefore failed to preserve a claim for appeal. 531 The
court of appeals reasoned that defense counsel consciously made a tactical decision to let the trial
court erroneously instruct the jury to use their common sense in the hopes that the jury’s
common sense would lead to the conclusion that the presence of other adults did not satisfy the
requirements of the statute.532 Affirming the conviction, the court of appeals held that a trial
judge’s erroneous instruction in a criminal case does not create grounds for appeal when defense
counsel consent to the trial judge’s erroneous instruction.533
Simants v. State
In Simants v. State,534 the court of appeals held that in sentencing for the sexual abuse of a minor
in the second degree, the existence of an ongoing sexual relationship with the minor does not
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necessarily preclude the establishment of a mitigating factor under the statute.535 Simants, a
thirty-three year old woman, agreed to oversee seventeen-year-old R.H.’s delinquency case plan
after R.H.’s mother moved out of town.536 While R.H. was living in Simants’s home, the two
engaged in sexual intercourse.537 At trial, the jury found that Simants’s position as an overseer of
R.H.’s case plan constituted a position of authority over R.H.538 Accordingly, Simants was
convicted of sexual abuse of a minor in the second degree.539 At sentencing, Simants asked the
court to impose a sentence below the presumptive range based on mitigating factors, including
the fact that the conduct was among the least serious conduct included in the offense.540 The
court rejected this factor as applicable because the sexual relationship was an on-going event
rather than a one-time occurrence.541 On appeal, Simants argued that the superior court erred in
rejecting the mitigating factor.542 The court of appeals reversed the lower court's decision,
reasoning that the superior court applied the wrong legal analyses in their rejection.543 A finding
that the intercourse occurred on multiple occasions was not sufficient by itself for the court to
reject the proposed AS 12.55.155(d)(9) factor.544 Reversing the lower court's decision, the court
of appeals held that in sentencing for the sexual abuse of a minor in the second degree, the
existence of an ongoing sexual relationship with a minor does not necessarily preclude the
establishment of a mitigating factor.545
Phillips v. State
In Phillips v. State546, the court of appeals held that a DUI conviction in Texas, which defines
“under the influence” more broadly than Alaska does, may be used to show a person has been
“previously convicted.”547 Though driving under the influence is typically a class A
misdemeanor in Alaska, it is elevated to a class C felony if the driver has been “previously
convicted” at least twice.548 This may include convictions from another jurisdiction if the offense
has “similar elements” to the Alaska statute.549 After a breath test revealed Phillips to be driving
in Alaska over the legal blood alcohol limit, he was indicted for felony DUI due to the fact that
he already had two DUI convictions in Texas and California.550 A jury trial found Phillips guilty
of felony DUI.551 On appeal, Phillips argued that the Texas statute under which he was convicted
was not similar to Alaska’s; therefore, his Texas conviction could not be used to convict him
with a felony in Alaska.552 The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's decision, reasoning
535
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that the legislative history of Alaska’s DUI statute revealed that the legislature intended for the
similarity requirement to be interpreted broadly.553 Further, the court of appeals noted that the
broader reach of the Texas DUI statute applied only to a few unusual cases and that in practice
the Texas statute functioned similarly to the Alaska statute.554 Affirming the lower court's
decision, the court of appeals held that a conviction for DUI in Texas could be used to establish a
person as “previously convicted,” regardless of the fact that Texas defines “under the influence”
more broadly than Alaska.555
Warlick v. State
In Warlick v. State,556 the court of appeals held that obtaining a state identification card using
another person's name and identifying information meets the elements of second-degree
forgery.557 In 2006, Warlick applied for an identification card from the Division of Motor
Vehicles ("DMV") using Jason Corgill's identifying information and name and was issued an
identification card in Corgill's name but with Warlick's photograph.558 When the State discovered
the deception, Warlick was charged with second-degree forgery and fraudulent application for a
state identification card.559 Warlick pleaded guilty to the forgery charge in exchange for the State
dismissing the fraudulent application charge.560 Before sentencing, Warlick filed a motion that
the facts of his case did not support a conviction for second-degree forgery, but the court denied
the motion.561 Warlick appealed that ruling.562 For a charge of second-degree forgery, the State
was required to prove that Warlick (1) acted with intent to defraud, (2) falsely made or
completed a written instrument, and that (3) this written instrument was a public record.563
Warlick argued that an application for a state identification card is a not a "public record."564 A
document is a public record if the application was (1) developed or received under law in
connection with the transaction of official business by DMV and (2) the document was preserved
by DMV as evidence of its organization, function, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or
other activities.565 The court found that the application met both of these qualifications.
Affirming the judgment of the superior court, the court held that a false application for a state
identification card does meet the elements of second-degree forgery.566
Young v. State
In Young v. State,567 the court of appeals held that the firing of a firearm from a car creates one
count of Misconduct Involving Weapons in the First Degree regardless of the number of people
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endangered.568 Young was a driver of a vehicle that began shooting at another vehicle in what
the police attributed to a gang dispute.569 Several individuals driving or walking by were put in
danger by the shooting.570 Young was charged with six counts of misconduct involving weapons,
one count for each bystander that was endangered and another count covering the whole
incident.571 The court stated that while the Alaska assault statute allowed for multiple convictions
from a single act that endangered multiple people, the statute was meant to punish the act of a
drive by shooting, regardless of whether or not someone was injured.572 The legislature did not
view the statute as an extension of the assault statute, therefore it is improper to base the number
of counts on the number of people endangered.573 The court of appeals held that the firing of a
firearm from a car creates one count of misconduct involving weapons regardless of the number
of people endangered.574
Fyfe v. State
In Fyfe v. State,575 the court of appeals held the state legislature did not intend to double the
range of fines for felony driving under the influence in a traffic safety corridor by statute. 576 Fyfe
was charged and convicted of felony driving under the influence.577 In addition to imprisonment,
the court imposed a $20,000 fine, which resulted from a doubling of the mandatory minimum
fine based on the State’s showing that the offense took place in a traffic safety corridor, pursuant
to statute.578 At sentencing, the trial court judge remarked that he would have imposed the
minimum fine were the court not bound by the statutory doubling.579 On appeal, Fyfe argued the
$20,000 fine was illegal because the legislature intended the double-fine requirement to apply
only to non-criminal traffic violations and not criminal offenses.580 The court of appeals applied
the sliding scale approach in statutory interpretation and held that the legislature did not intend
the double-fine requirement of the statute to apply felony driving under the influence.581
Rejecting the State’s argument that the statutory language reflected the intent to apply to all
motor vehicle and traffic offenses, the court of appeals found no direct references in the
legislative history to doubling fines for criminal motor vehicle offenses.582 Vacating the trial
court’s fine with an instruction to modify judgment to reflect the mandatory minimum, the court
of appeals held that the statute does not double criminal penalties for felony driving under the
influence in a traffic safety corridor.583
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Gamble v. State
In Gamble v. State,584 the court of appeals held that a minimum degree of understanding of the
proceedings and an ability to participate in one’s defense is sufficient for competency to stand
trial.585 Plaintiff was charged with violating a domestic violence protective order on two
occasions.586 Before trial, a forensic psychologist examined plaintiff and reported he was
delusional and unable to rationally defend himself or consult with his attorney.587 After
conducting a ninety-day, court-ordered stay at the Alaska Psychiatric Institute, the psychologist
found plaintiff’s condition was sufficiently improved.588 The trial court agreed, determining that
the plaintiff was competent to stand trial because he understood the nature of the proceedings
and the allegations made against him.589 On appeal, plaintiff argued the trial court erred in
determining that he was mentally competent to stand trial and should have deferred to his
attorney’s assertion that plaintiff was incompetent to aid in his own defense.590 The court of
appeals affirmed the lower court's decision, reasoning plaintiff’s mental illness did not bar him
from standing trial, as long as he was mentally aware enough to rationally participate.591 It
asserted that despite the attorney’s objections and privileged position to make an assessment
about competency, the ultimate decision was a product of the trial court’s independent
determination.592 Affirming the lower court's decision, the court of appeals held a plaintiff is
competent to stand trial when he understands the nature of the proceedings and can communicate
rationally to the court and his attorney.593
Morris v. State
In Morris v. State,594 the court of appeals held that the market value within the meaning of the
theft statute is the amount at which the property changes hands between a willing buyer and
willing seller aware of the pertinent facts.595 Morris was convicted of second-degree theft of an
item with a market value of greater than $500 for stealing a Canada Goose parka with a retail
price of $660–$740.596 On appeal, Morris argued that stolen property’s wholesale price, not retail
price, determines its “market value” because it is the amount the retailer paid to acquire the
property.597 The court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that the retail
price of a piece of property is prima facie evidence of its market value.598 A product’s market
value not only includes the wholesale price paid by the retailer, but also the cost for promoting,
packaging, and selling the product to the public.599 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the
court of appeals held that the market value for purposes of the theft statute is the amount at
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which the property passes from a willing seller to a willing buyer, neither of whom is under
compulsion and has knowledge of relevant facts.600
In the Matter of the Adoption of S.F.
In In the Matter of the Adoption of S.F.,601 the supreme court held that finding a biological father
abandoned his child, thus negating consent requirements for adoption, is supported by evidence
of lack of communication with the child or mother, disregarding parental obligations, and failing
to provide monetary support.602 S.F.’s mother’s husband petitioned to adopt S.F.603 The lower
court accepted a standing master’s report and recommendation, finding the biological father’s
consent unnecessary for the husband to adopt the child because the biological father abandoned
S.F. for over six months, failed to provide care or support for over a year, and did not
communicate with S.F. for over one year.604 On appeal, the biological father argued he attempted
to locate S.F. through Facebook and relatives, and was unaware of his obligation to pay child
support.605 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that sufficient
evidence existed to support the finding of abandonment that annulled the consent requirement for
adoption. The biological father knew how to contact S.F.’s mother, made minimal effort to
contact S.F. or S.F.’s mother, failed to provide child support, and made no efforts to exercise his
visitation rights.606 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held a biological
father’s consent to his child’s adoption is unnecessary when sufficient evidence supports a
finding of abandonment.607
Jackson v. State
In Jackson v. State,608 the court of appeals held that it is plain error not to instruct a jury on the
need for unanimity when the State describes multiple instances of conduct at trial but does not
specify which instance is the basis for the criminal charge.609 Jackson was charged with the
sexual assault of his long-term sexual partner, L.D.610 At his trial, the State discussed three
separate instances of sexual penetration that occurred within a single night and morning.611
Jackson defended each instance on separate grounds.612 The jury was not given any instruction
on coming to unanimous agreement regarding what act of sexual penetration supported a
conviction, if any.613 Jackson was convicted of sexual assault.614 On appeal, Jackson argued that
the superior court should have instructed the jury on the need for unanimity on the sexual assault
charge.615 The court of appeals reversed the lower court's decision, reasoning that under the due
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process clause of the Alaska Constitution, a defendant has a right to have jurors who are in
unanimous agreement regarding which act or acts the defendant committed.616 Further, the court
noted that such an error is not harmless when the defendant offers different defenses to the
separate instances of conduct alleged by the State.617 Reversing the lower court's decision, the
court of appeals held that a court must instruct the jury on the need for unanimity when the State
does not specify which act among those it describes is the basis of the charge.618
Geisler v. State
In Geisler v. State,619 the court of appeals held that an officer standing directly outside of an
individual’s car and attempting to control the behavior of the individuals within the car
constitutes a seizure, which if, unsupported by reasonable suspicion, is illegal.620 Geisler, who
was seen sitting in his car in the vicinity of a drug arrest, was arrested after a search of his car
revealed heroin.621 An undercover police officer was working with an informant to catch a drug
dealer.622 A while after the informant purchased the drugs, the dealer was arrested near an
apartment building.623 Suspecting that the dealer’s supplier must be close, the officers
approached Geisler’s vehicle, which was outside of the building.624 The officers, standing
directly outside of the car, asked for identification and repeatedly instructed Geisler and another
passenger not to move and to keep their hands on their laps.625 Eventually, the officers searched
Geisler and the car and found heroin.626 During trial, Geisler filed a motion to suppress the
evidence, but the motion was denied and Geisler was convicted.627 On appeal, Geisler argued
that the officers had illegally seized him.628 The court of appeals reversed the lower court’s
decision, reasoning that the officers engaged in a “show of authority” that made the encounter a
seizure.629 The court further reasoned that the reasonable person would interpret the officer’s
presence, stance, and directives to stop moving as authoritative and mandatory commands.630
Reversing the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that a seizure occurs when the
reasonable person would interpret an officer’s conduct as prohibiting the person from freely
leaving.631
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Welton v. State, Dep’t of Corrections
In Welton v. State, Dep’t of Corrections,632 the supreme court held a prisoner’s administrative
appeals from Department of Corrections (“DOC”) grievance proceedings do not qualify for
appellate review when there are insufficient paper records to create a record capable of appellate
review.633 Welton filed three appeals contesting the dismissal of her DOC administrative appeals
due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction.634 There is ordinarily no subject matter jurisdiction for
a court to hear an administrative appeal of a DOC decision, but there is an exception if the party
seeking an appeal demonstrates that (1) he or she alleged a violation of constitutional rights, (2)
the proceeding was adjudicative in nature, and (3) there is a sufficient record capable of appellate
review.635 The lower court held that the DOC proceedings were not adjudicative in nature and
that there was an insufficient record for appellate review. On appeal, Welton argued that the
dismissal of her administrative appeals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was erroneous.636
The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that DOC prisoner grievance
proceedings do not produce records capable of review because there is no proceeding at which
parties could present evidence, witnesses, or arguments.637 The supreme court further reasoned
that DOC grievance proceedings are not adjudicative in nature.638 Affirming the lower court’s
decision, the supreme court held that DOC grievance proceedings do not qualify for appellate
review because they are not adjudicative in nature and do not produce a record capable of
administrative review.639
Leggett v. State
In Leggett v. State,640 the court of appeals held a trial judge can consider inadmissible testimony
when assessing the admissibility of a defendant’s confession or when determining whether a
defendant’s confession is sufficiently corroborated to satisfy Alaska’s corpus delicti rule.641 Midtrial, a key witness withdrew by asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege, and a jury
subsequently convicted Leggett of driving under the influence relying on the key witness’s
statements outside of court to satisfy Alaska’s corpus delicti rule.642 The District Court held that
although the key witness’s out-of-court statements were inadmissible hearsay, the court could
rely on these hearsay statements to satisfy the corpus delicti rule and determine whether
Leggett’s prior admissions of driving under the influence to the police were corroborated by the
witness’s statements.643 On appeal, Leggett argued that the court can consider only admissible
testimony to corroborate testimony to satisfy the corpus delicti rule.644 The court of appeals
affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that judge’s corpus delicti decision is a
632

315 P.3d 1196 (Alaska 2014).
Id. at 1199.
634
Id. at 1196–97.
635
Id.
636
Id. at 1196–97.
637
Id. at 1198.
638
Id. at 1199.
639
Id.
640
320 P.3d 311 (Alaska Ct. App. 2014).
641
Id. at 312, 314–15.
642
Id. at 313.
643
Id.
644
Id. at 314.
633

45

foundational evidentiary ruling and therefore governed by Alaska Evidence Rule 104.645
Affirming the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that a trial judge can consider a
witness’s inadmissible, out-of-court statements to satisfy Alaska’s corpus delicti rule.646
Barr v. State
In Barr v. State,647 the court of appeals held that improper allowance of a juror’s question over
objection in court may be found to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.648 Barr was charged
with physical and sexual assault of M.B.649 At trial, a juror was allowed to ask the forensic nurse
who examined M.B. whether M.B.’s case was one of the worst beatings he had seen from
Northwest Alaska.650 Barr objected, but was overruled by the court, which held that the question
was relevant.651 The nurse responded that it was a pretty bad case.652 Subsequently, the jury
convicted Barr of some of his charges.653 On appeal, Barr argued that the superior court erred in
allowing the question654 and urged the court to adopt the approach of the Minnesota Supreme
Court, which held that juror questioning during criminal trials was impermissible and required
automatic reversal on appeal.655 The court of appeals instead affirmed the lower court's decision,
reasoning that there was no reasonable possibility that the evidence elicited by the juror question
affected the jury’s verdict.656 Affirming the lower court's decision, the court of appeals held that
improper allowance of a juror’s question over objection in court may be found to be harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.657
Maness v. Gordon
In Maness v. Gordon,658 the supreme court held that a claim based on repressed memory
syndrome must be supported by expert testimony to invoke the discovery rule and toll the statute
of limitations.659 Maness alleged that the defendants had sexually assaulted him as a child in the
1970s and that he had forgotten the incidents due to repressed memory syndrome.660
Nevertheless, Maness allegedly recovered his memory and discovered the incidents in 2007, and
he filed a claim against the defendants shortly thereafter.661 The lower court held that Maness’s
claims were barred by the statute of limitations and that he could not prove his repressed memory
syndrome claim without expert testimony.662 On appeal, Maness argued that the discovery rule
tolled the statute of limitations until he recovered his memory and discovered the
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incidents.663 The supreme court affirmed the lower court's decision, reasoning that his claim’s
need for expert testimony was supported by other courts and Alaska case law which require
expert testimony to prove medical or legal malpractice.664 The court also reasoned that Maness
misapplied a case which held that expert testimony was not necessary for the claim of recovered
memory of sexual abuse but also stated that expert testimony was necessary to toll the statute of
limitations.665 Affirming the lower court's decision, the supreme court held that requiring a claim
based on repressed memory syndrome must be supported by expert testimony to invoke the
discovery rule and toll the statute of limitations. 666
Mund v. State
In Mund v. State,667 the court of appeals held that felony defendants maintain their right to appeal
their sentence under Appellate Rule 215 despite receiving a sentence within the applicable
presumptive range, so long as the sentence exceeds two years and does not result from a plea
bargain.668 Mund was convicted of first-degree assault and sentenced within the applicable
presumptive range.669 On appeal, Mund argued that his sentence was excessive and that
Appellate Rule 215 superseded the statutory prohibition against appeals of sentences within the
applicable presumptive range, permitting the court of appeals to review his sentence.670 The
court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, and reasoned that since the Legislature
failed to exercise its authority to amend Appellate Rule 215, the appellate rule supersedes the
statute and continues to govern.671 The court further reasoned that the statute is invalid because
the Legislature did not intend to create two separate classes of appeals, and that the provisions of
the statute were not severable.672 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held
that felony defendants retain their right to appeal under Appellate Rule 215 even though their
sentence falls within the applicable presumptive range.673
Gou-Leonhardt v. State
In Gou-Leonhardt v. State,674 the Court of Appeals of Alaska held that the superior court could
not unilaterally deviate from the terms laid out in a plea agreement even though the defendant
completed a rehabilitating court wellness program.675 After Gou-Leonhardt completed his time in
the court-appointed wellness program, the superior court declined Gou-Leonhardt’s motion to
suspend imposition of his sentence so he could try to set aside his conviction upon completion of
probation.676 In the original plea agreement, both Gou-Leonhardt and the state agreed that GouLeonhardt would receive a sentence of 24 months in prison with all 24 months suspended and
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three years probation if he successfully completed the wellness program.677 On appeal, GouLeonhardt argued that the language of the statutory framework for the wellness court program
allowed the court to circumvent other laws and implement any sentence it might chose.678 The
court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision,679 reasoning that the superior court correctly
denied Gou-Leonhardt’s motion because the court was required to enforce the terms in the plea
agreement, including the specific sentence.680 The court of appeals further reasoned that if courts
were allowed to unilaterally deviate from plea agreements post-treatment, the government might
be less eager to enter into plea agreements that incorporate rehabilitating wellness treatments. 681
Affirming the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that the court is required to
enforce the terms of the plea agreement in a criminal proceeding, and cannot unilaterally deviate
from the agreement upon the defendant’s completion of a rehabilitating wellness program. 682
Charles v. State
In Charles v. State,683 the supreme court held that the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act
("ASORA") not only did not apply retroactively, but also did not apply to cases that are not yet
final or are on direct review.684 Charles was convicted of a sex offense in the 1980s.685 The
Alaska Legislature enacted ASORA in 1994.686 Because the statute was expressly retroactive, it
required Charles to register as a sex offender.687 In 2006, Charles was charged and convicted for
misdemeanor failure to register as a sex offender, which was affirmed on appeal in 2007.688
While the supreme court had previously held that ASORA could not be applied retroactively, the
State argued that because Charles's case was not final at the time of that decision, ASORA
should still be applied retroactively to him.689 The supreme court held that applying ASORA
retroactively in any case would violate the state constitution's ex post facto clause, and so
overturned Charles's conviction.690 Reasoning that similarly situated defendants should be treated
the same, the supreme court held that ASORA could not be applied retroactively in any case.691
Hannam v. State
In Hannam v. State,692 the court of appeals held a police officer’s sworn affidavit containing
extrinsic signs of driving under the influence provides an adequate factual basis for a guilty
plea.693 Hannam was pulled over and the trooper observed that Hannam had watery bloodshot
eyes, slurred speech, bad physical coordination, and other extrinsic signs of being under the
677
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influence of alcohol.694 After failing a field sobriety test the trooper arrested Hannam for driving
under the influence.695 Hannam initially resisted taking a breath test, however, after some time he
took two breath tests that showed an alcohol level of .000.696 The district court judge found there
was a factual basis for Hannam to enter a guilty plea.697 Hannam appeals arguing that due to the
breath test reading of .000 there was no factual basis for his guilty plea.698 The court of appeals
noted that the supreme court had found an adequate factual basis for a guilty plea to operating
under the influence when a sworn statement by a police officer included extrinsic signs of being
under the influence, including poor balance, weaving on the road and bloodshot eyes.699 The
court of appeals found that the supreme court decision controlled this decision and held a police
officer’s sworn affidavit containing extrinsic signs of driving under the influence provides an
adequate factual basis for a guilty plea.700
Anthony v. State
In Anthony v. State,701 the supreme court held that in a dispute over terms in a plea agreement,
the court should look to principles of contract interpretation, not statutory construction, to settle
the dispute.702 In 2010, Anthony pleaded guilty to the charge of felony driving under the
influence in exchange for admission into the State's Felony DUI Wellness Court.703 Under the
terms of the plea agreement, Anthony's sentence and fine would be suspended if he successfully
completed the Wellness Court program.704 The plea agreement specified that the superior court
must discharge Anthony from the program if there was a judicial finding of probable cause that
he drove a motor vehicle; however, the term "motor vehicle" was not defined.705 In 2011,
Anthony rode a motorized bicycle down a city avenue, where a Wellness Court probation officer
saw him and asserted that Anthony had violated his plea agreement by driving a “motor
vehicle."706 Anthony argued that while he had been riding a bicycle with a running motor, the
modified bicycle was not a "motor vehicle" under the plea agreement.707 The superior court
looked at the statutory definition of "motor vehicle" in Title 28, the motor vehicle code, and
found that there was probable cause that the modified bicycle was a "motor vehicle," and that
Anthony therefore must be discharged from the Wellness Court program.708 The supreme court
said that the superior court needed to address the parties' differing interpretations of the term
"motor vehicle" to decide if the motorized bicycle fell under the correct legal interpretation of
that term.709 In so doing, the court should use principles of contract interpretation, not statutory

694

Id. at 210.
Id.
696
Id.
697
Id. at 211.
698
Id.
699
Id. at 211.
700
Id.
701
329 P.3d 1027 (Alaska 2014).
702
Id. at 1031.
703
Id. at 1029.
704
Id.
705
Id.
706
Id.
707
Id. at 1030.
708
Id. at 1030–31.
709
Id. at 1031.
695

49

construction, to settle the dispute over terms.710 The court should look at the reasonable
expectations of the parties at the time they entered the agreement.711 Because the state has greater
bargaining power during criminal plea agreements, the court is required to construe any
ambiguity against the state.712 Remanding the case to superior court to address the parties'
reasonable expectations of what constituted a "motorized vehicle," the supreme court held that
principles of contract interpretation govern disputes over terms in plea agreements, even though
statutory interpretations can be an appropriate starting point for its analysis.713
Wassilie v. State
In Wassilie v. State,714 the court of appeals held that an attorney has an obligation to initiate the
appeal of an indigent defendant who wishes to appeal at the public’s expense, even after the
superior court has dismissed a petition for post-conviction relief and allowed the attorney to
withdraw.715 The attorney of Wassilie, an indigent defendant, filed a certificate of no arguable
merit following a conviction, meaning that the defendant had no colorable claims to raise on
appeal and that the judge should dismiss it.716 After Wassilie failed to respond in opposition, the
superior court dismissed his case.717 Wassilie then sent a personal letter to the supreme court,
which was considered a notice of appeal.718 The court of appeals issued an order requesting the
State, the Public Defender Agency, and the Office of Public Advocacy to file legal memoranda
addressing the issues.719 The court of appeals reasoned that since the decision to appeal must be
made in a relatively short period following conviction, an attorney’s duty to his client requires
that even with withdrawal, a client’s rights must be preserved.720 The court further reasoned that
since it is often impracticable for the defendant to find substitute counsel in such a short period
of time, the withdrawing attorney must ascertain whether the defendant wishes to appeal, and if
necessary, initiate the appeal.721The court of appeals concluded that attorneys are obligated to
initiate the appeals process if desired by an indigent defendant at the public’s expense, even after
they have been allowed to withdraw.722
Johnson v. State
In Johnson v. State,723 the court of appeals held that an attorney is not required to file a petition
for sentence review when the defendant has entered into a plea agreement with a fixed
sentence.724 Johnson entered into a plea agreement in 2009 in which he plead guilty to sexual
assault in the third degree in exchange for the state’s dismissal of three other sexual counts.725 He
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agreed to a sentence of 22 years with 10 years suspended and 12 years to serve.726 Johnson
argued that his attorney was required to file a petition for sentence review at his request.727 His
attorney failed to do so, and therefore Johnson alleges he suffered from ineffective assistance of
counsel.728 On appeal, the court differentiated previous cases from Johnson’s case because
Johnson’s plea agreement included a set sentence, without any judicial discretion for the
sentence.729 A sentence review would be a repudiation of the entire plea agreement. Therefore,
Johnson needed to seek rescission of the entire agreement.730 Johnson did seek recession and his
petition was denied.731 His attorney was not required to file a sentence review because that would
allow a defendant to seek enforcement of certain provisions of a plea agreement while rejecting
others, such as sentence length.732 The court of appeals held that an attorney is not required to
file a petition for sentence review when the defendant has entered into a plea agreement with a
fixed sentence. 733
Tickett v. State
In Tickett v. State,734 the court of appeals held that even if a trial court errs in precluding crossexamination of an expert through the use of a learned treatise, if the error is harmless, then the
resulting sentence would still not be clearly mistaken.735 After hitting two people and a team of
sled dogs while a snow machine at sixty miles an hour, Tickett was convicted of manslaughter,
first-degree assault, and driving under the influence.736 At trial, the state offered expert testimony
concerning the effects of cocaine and marijuana, including their effects when combined with
alcohol, and establishing that Tickett’s blood tested positive for all three substances at the time of
the collision.737 During cross-examination, Tickett attempted to question the state’s expert using
a learned treatise which provided that the combined effect of marijuana and alcohol actually
lower the risk of causing an accident on the road.738 When the state’s expert denied recognizing
the author or knowing anything about the treatise, Tickett was precluded from using the learned
treatise during his cross-examination despite the testimony of other experts in the trial
confirming the status of the treatise.739 On appeal, Tickett argues that the inability to crossexamine one of the state’s experts using the learned treatise rises to the level of constitutional
error, and requires a reversal of his conviction.740 The court of appeals affirmed Tickett’s
conviction, despite holding that the trial court erred in precluding him from cross-examining the
state’s expert on the learned treatise, reasoning that because Tickett was allowed to crossexamine other experts on the treatise and Tickett did not mention the testimony in his closing to
the jury that this error probably did not rise to the level of constitutional dimension and was
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harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in any case.741 Affirming Tickett’s conviction despite the
trial court’s error in precluding Tickett from cross-examining the state’s witness on a learned
treatise, the court of appeals held that when taken in context of the trial as a whole, if the error is
harmless, then the resulting sentence is not clearly mistaken.742
Geisinger v. State
In Geisinger v. State,743 the court of appeals held that a criminal defendant has one year from the
date the decision on appeal is final to file an application for post-conviction relief, regardless of
whether the defendant appealed his conviction, his sentence, or both.744 Geisinger was convicted
and sentenced for a number of crimes following a fatal motor vehicle accident.745 Geisinger
appealed his sentence as excessive and his sentence was affirmed by the court of appeals.746
Then, Geisinger filed for post-conviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.747 The
trial court dismissed Geisinger’s application for post-conviction relief, reasoning that the statute
of limitation for post-conviction relief was not tolled by an appeal of only a criminal sentence.748
Instead, the trial court ruled that a defendant must file for post-conviction relief within eighteen
months of the date of entry of judgment in the criminal case.749 Reversing the trial court’s
dismissal of Geisinger’s application for post-conviction relief, the court of appeals held that a
defendant has one year from the date of decision on appeal to file for post-conviction relief.750
Accordingly, the court remanded Geisinger’s post-conviction relief claim on the grounds that
Geisinger timely filed following his appeal of his sentence.751 Reasoning that a defendant’s
opportunity to file an application for post-conviction relief should not depend on whether a
defendant appealed his conviction or his sentence, the court of appeals held that a defendant has
one year from the date of final decision on appeal to apply for post-conviction relief.752
Crawford v. State
In Crawford v. State,753 the court of appeals held that a trial judge does not abuse his discretion
in making several evidentiary rulings that are unfavorable to a pro se litigant.754 After waiving
his right to an attorney in lieu of representing himself at trial, Keane-Alexander Crawford was
convicted of second-degree murder for shooting and killing his sister’s fiancé after the two men
got into a physical altercation.755 After deciding not to recuse himself as Crawford requested, the
trial judge made several evidentiary rulings against Crawford, continually expressed his
unhappiness with Crawford’s decision to proceed as a pro se litigant, and denied Crawford’s
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request to use public funds to secure an expert witness in his defense.756 On appeal, Crawford
requested a new trial, arguing that a new trial was warranted due to the trial judge’s mistaken
evidentiary rulings, prejudice against him, and denial of his request to use public funds to obtain
an expert witness.757 The court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision with respect to the
trial judges rulings and decision not to recuse himself,758 reasoning that most of the evidentiary
rulings were not in error or were otherwise harmless, and that the trial judge’s unhappiness with
Crawford’s choice to represent himself did not require recusal nor a new trial.759 Affirming the
lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that a trial judge does not abuse his discretion by
making evidentiary rulings against a pro se litigant.760
Anderson v. State
In Anderson v. State,761 the court of appeals held that a lower court has committed harmless error
when it fails to instruct the jury that they cannot convict a defendant unless they unanimously
agree on the particular conduct underlying that count if the State can show beyond a reasonable
doubt that if the jury had been properly instructed they would have returned the same verdict.762
Anderson was convicted of ten counts of second-degree sexual abuse of a minor, based on
several instances of sexual contact with three different young girls.763 The girls in question were
unable to identify the dates of the individual acts of sexual conduct, and the indictment instead
contained ranges of dates that were broad enough to potentially encompass two or more acts of
sexual contact, leading to the possibility that the jury did not reach unanimous agreement about
the criminal incident that was the basis for its guilty verdicts on each count.764 Alaska law
requires that jurors unanimously agree on the particular episode of criminal conduct that forms
the basis for a guilty verdict, but the trial judge failed to instruct the jurors that, with respect to
each count, they could not convict Anderson unless they unanimously agreed on the particular
conduct underlying that count.765 The court of appeals found that the trial judge had committed
an obvious error, but that the error was ultimately harmless.766 The State had the burden of
showing that there was no reasonable possibility that the jury, if properly instructed, would have
returned a different verdict.767 The court of appeals reasoned that because at trial Anderson's
defense was that all of the accusations against him were factually false and because the State's
theory of the case was consistent as to each act of sexual contact, there was not a reasonable
possibility that the jury might believe that the State had proved some of the acts of sexual contact
but not others.768 The courts of appeals affirmed Anderson's conviction, holding that a lower
court has committed harmless error when it fails to instruct the jury that they cannot convict a
defendant unless they unanimously agree on the particular conduct underlying that count if the
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State can show beyond a reasonable doubt that if the jury had been properly instructed they
would have returned the same verdict.769
Rae v. State
In Rae v. State,770 the court of appeals held that an indictment need not be dismissed when
improper evidence may have been the decisive factor in one grand juror’s decision to indict.771
Rae was indicted by a grand jury based on evidence that he stole a truck and used it to crash into
the side of a store to steal large amounts of beer,772 including kegs and bottles of beer found in
Rae’s trailer pursuant to a search warrant.773 At trial, one grand juror asked whether there was a
way to know for sure that the kegs found in Rae’s trailer were the actual kegs stolen.774 In
response, the state presented testimony that each of the store’s kegs had a unique UPC code and
that the UPC codes of the stolen kegs matched those found in Rae’s trailer.775 The grand jury
subsequently returned a true bill on all counts.776 Five months later, it was discovered that the
search warrant application hearing related to the case had not been recorded, and as a result the
superior court granted Rae’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to the search
warrant at trial but denied Rae’s motion to dismiss the indictment.777 The superior court held
that the remaining grand jury evidence was sufficient to support the indictment, and that the
presentation of the search warrant evidence had not appreciably affected the grand jury’s
decision.778 On appeal, Rae argued that his indictment was tainted by the introduction of the
inadmissible evidence at the grand jury, and that the remaining evidence was insufficient to
support the indictment.779 The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's decision,
reasoning that the evidence that a single grand juror may have been persuaded by the
impermissible evidence does not apply to the remaining grand jurors, and as grand jury decides
cases by majority vote, the whole grand jury need not have returned an indictment.780
Furthermore, the inadmissible evidence was not presented at trial and still the trial jury returned
guilty verdicts, demonstrating that the probative force of the remaining evidence was not
weak.781 Affirming the lower court's decision, the court of appeals held that an indictment need
not be dismissed when improper evidence may have been the decisive factor in one grand juror’s
decision to indict.782
Stiffarm v. State
In Stiffarm v. State,783 the court of appeals held that it is a violation of a criminal defendant’s
discovery rights for a trial court to deny requested discovery as unduly burdensome based solely
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on unsupported assertions that the requested information was confidential.784 Anthony Stiffarm,
an inmate at the Wildwood Correctional Center in Kenai, was charged with sexually assaulting a
female tutor who worked in the facility in the stairwell.785 Because the correction officers
suspected Stiffarm, the victim was given a booking photo of Stiffarm only, and identified
Stiffarm as the man who attacked her.786 During discovery, Stiffarm filed a motion to compel the
Department of Corrections to disclose a list of inmates with a similar appearance and build to
Stiffarm so that the identification procedures could be questioned during trial.787 The trial court
denied the motion on the grounds that the Department of Corrections asserted that the booking
photographs were confidential, and so Stiffarm’s request would be unduly burdensome.788 The
court of appeals remanded the case to the superior court,789 reasoning that the superior court
erred in summarily denying the request for production based entirely on the Department of
Corrections’ unsupported assertions that the photographs and corresponding information was
confidential.790 Remanding the case for further consideration, the court of appeals held that for a
trial court to summarily deny a discovery request as unduly burdensome based solely on
assertions that the information requested is confidential is a violation of a criminal defendant’s
discovery rights.791
Floyd v. State
In Floyd v. State,792 the court of appeals found that the public interest exception does not apply
when an ex convict challenges the state’s parole laws and the issue becomes moot because the
convict is unconditionally released from his sentence.793 Floyd filed a lawsuit claiming that
Alaska’s mandatory parole statute conflicted with its good time credit statutes.794 Once Floyd
reached the end of his mandatory parole period the issue became moot.795 The superior court
granted the state’s motion to dismiss.796 On appeal Mulling’s argued that the public interest
exception applied to the issue, and the motion to dismiss should not have been granted.797 The
court of appeals affirmed the lower court finding that other prisoners on mandatory parole longer
than Floyd will be able to bring the claim in the future, therefore the issue did not fall within the
public interest exception.798 Affirming the lower court, the court of appeals found that the public
interest exception does not apply when an ex convict challenges the state’s parole laws and the
issue becomes moot because the convict is unconditionally released from his sentence.799
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Daniels v. State
In Daniels v. State,800 the court of appeals held that unclear judicial writing regarding nonstatutory mitigating factors used in sentencing determinations should be remanded to the lower
court for clarification.801 Early on New Year's Day 2012, Daniels, driving drunk, hit two
pedestrians in a residential area of Anchorage, causing severe injuries, and attempted to flee the
scene before crashing his truck.802 Daniels pleaded guilty to driving under the influence and firstdegree assault for knowingly engaging in conduct that resulted in serious physical injury under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, with his sentencing
left open.803 Daniels requested that he be referred to a three-judge sentencing panel to consider a
sentence below the presumptive range of seven to eleven years, but the sentencing judge denied
this request.804 A sentencing court must refer a case to the three-judge sentencing panel if the
defendant proves a non-statutory mitigating factor with clear and convincing evidence, and the
judge concludes that it would be manifestly unjust to fail to consider that non-statutory factor in
imposing the defendant's sentence.805 Daniels argued the non-statutory mitigating factor that he
had extraordinary potential for rehabilitation.806 The judge was required to determine if Daniels
had established this non-statutory mitigating factor, and if so, whether it would be manifestly
unjust to fail to consider the non-statutory mitigating factor in imposing his sentence.807 Here, the
judge's analysis was unclear. He stated that Daniels had great potential for rehabilitation, and
expressed concern about putting him in prison for such a long time, yet ultimately found that
Daniels's potential for rehabilitation was not so extraordinary that it warranted referral to the
three-judge panel.808 Daniels and the State differed in how to read the judge's remarks.809 The
court of appeals also could not determine whether the judge had found that Daniels had
established extraordinary potential for rehabilitation, and if so, if the court considered if it would
be manifestly unjust to fail to make an adjustment to the presumptive range based on this
factor.810 Remanding the case, the court of appeals held that the sentencing court should use clear
language in its consideration of non-statutory mitigating factors in sentencing decisions.811
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ELECTION LAW
Price v. Kenai Peninsula Borough
In Price v. Kenai Peninsula Borough,812 the supreme court held that an ordinance which applies
to particular cities, but is of general, boroughwide interest and does not apply to a permanently
closed class, is not local or special legislation.813 Of the six cities within the Kenai Peninsula
Borough in Alaska, four are general law cities, and two are home rule cities.814 In 2008, the
Borough Assembly adopted an ordinance which allowed general law cities in the Borough to tax
nonprepared food items on a year round basis.815 In 2010, Price, a citizen of the Borough, filed a
referendum petition to repeal the ordinance.816 The Borough Clerk rejected the application on the
ground that the proposed referendum constituted local or special legislation, violative of Alaska
law in allowing all Borough voters to vote on an issue that only impacted particular cities.817 The
superior court agreed and held that the proposed referendum was local or specific legislation,
reasoning it lacked general boroughwide applicability because its substance and purpose was to
take the power to tax groceries away from the general law cities.818 On appeal, the Borough
Clerk similarly argued that the ordinance was not a boroughwide concern because it would only
impact the taxation scheme within the general law cities.819 The supreme court reversed the
superior court’s decision, reasoning that the ordinance was of general concern to the entire
borough because it applied to all borough residents who shopped in the general law cities.820 The
court also reasoned that class of general law cities in the borough could theoretically grow in the
future.821 Reversing the superior court’s decision, the supreme court held that an ordinance
which applies to particular cities, but is of general, boroughwide interest and does not apply to a
permanently closed class, is not local or special legislation.822

812

331 P.3d 356 (Alaska 2014).
Id. at 362.
814
Id. at 358.
815
Id.
816
Id.
817
Id.
818
Id.at 360.
819
Id.
820
Id.at 362.
821
Id.
822
Id.
813

57

EMPLOYMENT LAW
Coppe v. Bleicher
In Coppe v. Bleicher,823 the supreme court held that when the Alaska Workers' Compensation
Board ("the Board") errs by failing to apply a presumption of compensability, such an error may
be considered harmless if the Board undertakes an alternative, hypothetical analysis where they
do apply the presumption and the evidence presented adequately overcomes the presumption.824
Coppe filed a workers' compensation claim with the Board in 2005, two years after she had
stopped working at the Bleichers' medical office.825 Because of the late filing, the Board did not
attach a presumption of compensability to Coppe's claim, but did do an alternative hypothetical
analysis where the presumption did apply.826 The Board denied her claim, and Coppe appealed to
the Alaska Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission ("the Commission").827 The
Commission affirmed the Board's decision because any issue with the Board's decision not to
apply the presumption analysis was moot because the Board had analyzed the evidence in two
ways, one applying the presumption and one not applying it.828 On appeal, Coppe argued that the
Commission failed to apply the proper presumption of compensability to her claim. 829 The
supreme court affirmed the Commission’s decision, reasoning that while the Board did err in
determining that the presumption analysis did not apply, the error was harmless because the
Board used an alternative analysis in which it correctly applied the presumption of analysis. 830 In
affirming the Commission’s decision, the supreme court held that the failure to apply a
presumption of compensability to a claim before the Board may be considered harmless if the
Board undertakes an alternative, hypothetical analysis where they do apply the presumption and
conclude that the evidence presented adequately overcomes the presumption.831
Louie v. BP Exploration Alaska, Inc.
In Louie v. BP Exploration Alaska, Inc.,832 supreme court held that the version of a statute
governing workers’ compensation in effect at the time of an employee’s injury dictates the rate
of compensation the employee is due.833 Louie, an employee of BP Exploration Alaska, Inc.,
suffered a debilitating stroke while traveling for work.834 At the time of his injury, workers’
compensation law imposed a statutory maximum of $700 per week in benefits.835 Within months
of the injury, the statute in question was amended; the weekly maximum was abolished, and a
variable rate was introduced in its place.836 Louie filed a workers’ compensation claim,
requesting a compensation rate adjustment and Permanent Total Disability.837 The Alaska
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Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission (“the Commission”) held that the statute as it
existed at the time of the injury governed the rate of compensation, and denied the rate
adjustment.838 On appeal, Louie, argued that his date of disability should be used to calculate his
benefits, as the use of the date of his injury did not fairly compensate him for lost wages.839 The
supreme court affirmed the Commission's decision, reasoning that the general rule is that the law
in effect on the date of injury governs a workers’ compensation claim.840 Further, the court noted
that there is authority to suggest that the law in place at the date of disability should be used to
calculate benefits.841 Affirming the Commission's decision, the supreme court held that the
version of a statute in place on the date of an employee’s injury governs a workers’
compensation claim.842
Humphrey v. Lowe’s Home Improvement Warehouse, Inc.
In Humphrey v. Lowe’s Home Improvement Warehouse, Inc.,843 the supreme court held that
conflicting evidence is insufficient to overturn a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board
so long as substantial evidence supports the decision.844 Humphrey was injured while working at
Lowe’s Home Improvement Warehouse in Fairbanks.845 Though he continually received
medical care for his injury, Humphrey returned to work.846 Several months later, Humphrey
informed Lowe’s that he was leaving his job due to personal reasons.847 Humphrey subsequently
filed a workers’ compensation claim, seeking relief including medical benefits, temporary total
disability benefits, and attorneys’ fees.848 The Workers’ Compensation Board determined that
Humphrey was entitled to medical benefits but not temporary total disability benefits because it
found that Humphrey had voluntarily left his job at Lowe’s for reasons unrelated to his injury.849
Humphrey filed an appeal with Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission, who affirmed the
finding.850 On appeal to the supreme court, Humphrey argued that the Board’s finding was
based on inconsistent witness testimony and that the Board’s decision should not have been
accepted by the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission without requiring the Board to
explain such inconsistencies.851 The supreme court affirmed the Commission's decision,
reasoning that it had never required the Board to explain every inconsistency in the lay testimony
it relies on.852 Even if the testimony was inconsistent in some details, it substantially supported
the position that Humphrey voluntarily quit.853 Affirming the Workers’ Compensation Appeals
Commission's decision, the supreme court held that conflicting evidence is insufficient to
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overturn a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board so long as substantial evidence
supports the decision.854
Becker v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc.
In Becker v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc.,855 the supreme court held a detailed work manual without
express language stating that the policy is not legally binding leads to a triable question of fact.
856
Becker worked as a loss prevention manager at Fred Meyer for 17 years.857 While attempting
to arrest an individual, who had attempted theft, Becker grabbed the individuals phone and threw
it on the roof.858 Becker was terminated due to the incident.859 The superior court granted a
summary motion judgment in favor of Fred Meyer stating that the employment agreement was
terminable at will.860 On appeal, Becker argues that the loss prevention work manual was part of
the work contract.861 Becker states that the work manual would make a reasonable person believe
that only a violation of six listed procedures could result in immediate termination.862 Therefore,
his termination, which he argues did not violate any of the listed procedures, was a breach of
contract.863 Reversing the lower court, the supreme court held that whether the manual was part
of the employment contract was a triable issue of fact, reasoning that this case fell between the
situation where a manual plainly states that employers may deviate from the manual and the
situation where the manual is so specific as to suggest an exhaustive list.864 Therefore, the
supreme court reversed the summary judgment ruling and held a detailed work manual without
express language stating the policy is not legally binding leads to a triable question of fact. 865
Moody v. Royal Wolf Lodge
In Moody v. Royal Wolf Lodge,866 the supreme court held that employees qualify as professional
employees exempt from overtime pay under the Alaska Wage and Hour Act (AWHA) if their
primary duty requires specialized intellectual instruction as a standard prerequisite for entrance
into the profession.867 Moody, a pilot employed by Royal Wolf Lodge, brought action against the
Lodge for unpaid overtime wages under AHWA.868 The Lodge argued Moody was a professional
employee exempt from AWHA.869 The superior court held that Moody was an exempt
professional employee under AWHA and was not entitled to overtime pay. On appeal, Moody
argued his primary duties lacked the advanced knowledge obtained through prolonged,
specialized institutional instruction required for classification as a professional employee.870 The
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supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that in 2005, the Alaska Legislature
amended AWHA to adopt the federal definition of “professional employee,” which differed from
the four-part test applied in the superior court.871 The new definition requires professional
employees’ primary duties to require advanced knowledge acquired through prolonged,
specialized, intellectual instruction.872 Moody’s credentials as a pilot, including passing written
and oral tests regarding FAA rules and a certain amount of flying experience, do not involve
“specialized intellectual instruction” as required for professional employee status under
AWHA.873 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that determining
whether an employee qualifies as “professional employees” exempt from overtime pay under
AHWA requires determining whether an employee’s primary duties require specialized
instruction and academic training as a prerequisite for entering the profession.874
Resurrection Bay Auto Parts, Inc. v. Alder
In Resurrection Bay Auto Parts, Inc. v. Alder,875 the supreme court held an employer must
provide evidence on all four requirements of an overtime exemption for the court to reverse a
lower court.876 Alder filed suit against his employer Mullings and Resurrection Bay alleging that
Mullings had violated the overtime laws.877 It is undisputed that Alder worked overtime hours,
however Mullings claims Alder was exempt from overtime payment because he was an
executive employee.878 The superior court found Mullings only proved one of the four
requirements and concluded that Alder was not an exempt overtime employee.879 On appeal,
Mullings’ argument was based on proving one of the four requirements, that one of Alder’s
primary duties was management.880 The supreme court affirmed the lower court finding that even
if Mullings met that one requirement, he clearly failed in one of the other requirements and he
needed to prevail on all four.881 Without any evidence in the record to support each of the four
requirements the superior court could not reach a different conclusion.882 Affirming the lower
court the supreme court held an employer must provide evidence on all four requirements for an
overtime exemption for the court to reverse a lower court.883
State, Division of Workers’ Compensation v. Titan Enterprises, LLC
In State, Division of Workers’ Compensation v. Titan,884 the supreme court held that successful
non-claimants in a worker’s compensation claim are entitled to attorneys’ fees.885 Christianson,
the owner of several businesses, collectively referred to as Titan, failed to carry workers’
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compensation insurance as required by Alaska law.886 The Division of Workers’ Compensation
(“the Division”) investigated Titan and found Titan to be in violation of the statute.887
Accordingly, Titan was fined more than $6 million.888 Titan appealed to the Alaska Workers’
Compensation Appeals Commission (“the Commission”) and the Commission reversed part of
the basis for the fine, while still affirming the Division’s argument that the corporate veil had
been pierced.889 Titan then requested, and was awarded by the Commission, attorneys’ fees as
the successful party on appeal.890 On review of the Commission’s decision, the Division argued
that the statute should be construed to prohibit attorneys’ fees where the successful party is an
employer who has been fined for failing to insure, rather than a claimant.891 The supreme court
agreed with the Commission’s decision in part, reasoning that the language of the statute does
not limit attorneys’ fees only to successful claimants, but successful parties.892 The court further
reasoned that it is not the court’s role to rewrite statutes, even if it appears the legislature made a
mistake in drafting.893 Reversing the Commission’s decision, the supreme court held that
attorneys’ fees in appeals to the Commission are not restricted to successful claimant.894
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ETHICS
McAlpine v. Priddle
In McApline v. Priddle,895 the supreme court held that an arbitration decision carried out under
Alaska’s Revised Uniform Arbitration Act concerning an attorney’s fee dispute is only
reviewable in instances of (1) fraud, (2) evident partiality by the arbitrators, (3) refusal to
consider material evidence, (4) abuse of power, (5) a prior agreement not to arbitrate, or (6) lack
of proper notice.896 McAlpine paid Priddle $75,000 to represent her boyfriend in federal criminal
proceedings.897 Duarte’s case did not go to trial, and McAlpine argued that the contract she
signed required full payment only if the case went to trial and required experts.898 At arbitration
Priddle presented a contract allegedly signed by McApline acknowledging that the fee was
nonrefundable.899 The arbitration panel concluded that the fee was reasonable.900 On appeal,
McAlpine argued that the arbitrators failed to assess the reasonableness of the attorney’s fee
properly and did not assign proper weight to the evidence, as well as that Priddle misled his
client and presented forged evidence to the panel.901 The supreme court confirmed the arbitration
panel’s decision, reasoning that McAlpine’s arguments did not satisfy any of the grounds for
judicial review of an arbitration decision.902 Upon determining that only the fraud factor was
even potentially met, the supreme court concluded that the arbitration panel’s finding regarding
the alleged fraud was not reviewable because it was a factual finding.903 Confirming the
arbitration panel’s decision, the supreme court held that an arbitration decision carried out under
Alaska’s Revised Uniform Arbitration Act concerning an attorney’s fee dispute is only
reviewable in instances of (1) fraud, (2) evident partiality by the arbitrators, (3) refusal to
consider material evidence, (4) abuse of power, (5) a prior agreement not to arbitrate, or (6) lack
of proper notice.904
In re Estelle
In In re Estelle, the supreme court held that suspension is an appropriate sanction for judges who
have recklessly violated ethical duties in the code of judicial conduct.905 Here, a district court
judge signed pay affidavits which stated that no matters had been pending for more than six
months,906 when in fact three of his cases had been pending for more than six months without a
decision.907 Because the judge’s judicial assistant would draw attention to matters pending close
to six months by highlighting them in pink and putting them in the judge’s chair, he knew that
each of the cases needed a decision.908 The commission of judicial conduct found the judge’s
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signing of inaccurate pay affidavits to be reckless,909 held there was clear and convincing
evidence that the his behavior violated the code of judicial conduct,910 and recommended that he
be suspended without pay for 45 days.911 In his answer to the commission’s recommendation,
the judge admitted that he violated the code of judicial conduct.912 The supreme court ultimately
adopted the recommendation, following the commission’s reasoning that because the standard
sanction for negligence was suspension and the his reckless behavior rose above mere
negligence, suspension without pay for 45 days was an appropriate sanction.913 The court further
reasoned that the judge’s misconduct had been established by clear and convincing evidence.914
Adopting the commission’s recommendation, the supreme court held that suspension is an
appropriate sanction for judges who have recklessly violated ethical duties in the code of judicial
conduct.915
In re Miles
In In re Miles,916 the supreme court held that disbarment is an appropriate sanction for an
attorney who misappropriated the funds of a deceased client and subsequently hides the
misappropriation by means of deception while providing legal services to the personal
representative of estate of the deceased client.917 Miles helped her client open two bank accounts
and after the client died, Miles moved money from one account into Miles’ personal bank
account.918 Although the deceased client did not have a will, Miles argued that her client
intended to gift the money to Miles.919 The Area Hearing Committee (“Committee”) found that
Miles had committed a criminal act of theft, misappropriation, or wrongful conversation.920 The
Alaska Bar Association’s Disciplinary Board (“Board”) adopted the Committee’s findings and
recommended disbarment.921 Adopting the Board’s recommendation of disbarment, the supreme
court found that Miles committed the criminal act of theft, misappropriation, or wrongful
conversation because at the time Miles transferred her client’s funds to her personal account, she
knew that the funds had not been conveyed to her.922 The supreme court further reasoned that
disbarment was an appropriate sanction because the mitigating factor of Miles’ cooperativeness
in disciplinary proceedings was outweighed by her dishonesty, refusal to acknowledge
wrongdoing, and indifference to making restitution.923 Thus, the supreme court held that
disbarment is an appropriate sanction when a lawyer’s serious criminal conduct includes
misappropriation or theft and that conduct is not mitigated by other factors.924
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FAMILY LAW
Stephanie W. v. Maxwell V.
In Stephanie W. v. Maxwell V.,925 the supreme court held that, in a custody hearing, one parent’s
good faith allegations concerning the other parent’s behavior must not be held against the
reporting parent in determining the continuing-relationship factor where those allegations are
based on supporting evidence.926 The mother reported that the father was manufacturing
methamphetamines in the presence of the child, but presented almost no evidence in support of
such an allegation.927 The lower court determined that this allegation, without credible evidence,
demonstrated that the continuing-relationship determination favored granting custody to the
father because it showed a tendency by the mother to assume the worst in the father.928 The
superior court granted primary physical custody to the father and joint legal custody to both
parents.929 On appeal, the mother argued that the superior court had abused its discretion by
holding her good faith allegation against her.930 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s
decision, reasoning that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in considering the mother’s
unfounded allegations relevant to the continuing-relationship determination.931 The court further
reasoned that the unfounded allegation that the father was manufacturing methamphetamines in
the presence of the child evidenced a proclivity to assume the worst in the father.932 Affirming
the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that that the superior court does not abuse its
discretion in considering unfounded allegations by one parent against the other in determining
that the continuing-relationship factor favored the father.933
Simone H. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services
In Simone H. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services,934 the supreme court held that it is
within a trial court’s discretion to deny disclosure of the child’s psychotherapy records where the
court reviews the content and nature of the records.935 The parent requested the lower court grant
her access to records of her child’s communications with his psychotherapist for use in her
child’s Child in Need of Aid (“CINA”) proceeding.936 The trial court reviewed the records of the
child’s psychotherapy sessions and did not find the information the parent sought to uncover, or
any other need for disclosure that outweighed the child’s interest in privacy.937 Thus, the trial
court denied the parent’s request for disclosure, finding that such disclosure of the child’s
confidential communications would constitute an invasion of his privacy causing the child undue
stress and compromising his therapeutic relationship with his counselor.938 On appeal, the parent
argued that records of the child’s psychotherapy sessions should be released for her use, as the
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records might document the child’s struggles with his foster family.939 The parent also argued
that there was no evidence suggesting the child would be detrimentally affected by disclosure of
his communications with his psychotherapist.940 The supreme court affirmed the lower court
after reviewing the child’s psychotherapy records and confirming that the records did not contain
the evidence that the parent sought to uncover regarding the child’s relationship with his foster
family.941 Moreover, the supreme court determined that the trial court rightfully considered the
informed recommendation of the child’s guardian ad litem, which detailed the harmful effects
the release of the records could have on the child.942 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the
supreme court held that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in denying the parent’s
request to disclose the child’s confidential psychotherapy records, where the lower court
properly considered all relevant factors in in rendering its decision.943
James R. v. Kylie R.
In James R. v. Kylie R.,944 the supreme court held that during a child custody hearing one
parent’s unfounded concerns about the other parent’s caretaking ability can be evidence of an
unwillingness to foster an on-going relationship between the child and the non-custodial
parent.945 After finding both parents’ caretaking abilities adequate, the superior court granted
custody to Kylie because she showed more willingness to foster an on-going relationship
between the child and James.946 During the child custody hearing, James repeatedly drew the
worst possible inferences about Kylie’s parental conduct based on inconclusive evidence of
neglect.947 On appeal, James argued that the superior court had erred by prompting him to report
concerns about the mother’s parenting skills and then holding those statements against James in
determining the continuing-relationship factor.948 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s
decision,949 reasoning that the superior court did not abuse its discretion because its decision
constituted a valid determination of James’s credibility as a witness in court.950 The supreme
court further reasoned that the lower court’s on-going relationship inquiry could be informed not
only by direct testimony, but also by a parent’s own actions and attitudes during the court
proceedings.951 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that unwillingness
to foster an on-going relationship can be demonstrated by a parent’s unfounded concerns about
the other parent’s caretaking ability during a court proceeding.952
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Limeres v. Limeres
In Limeres v. Limeres,953 the supreme court held that when a superior court makes a
determination in favor of supervised visits in a child custody case based on the parent's failure to
complete court-ordered batterers' classes, an erroneous finding of fact that there is a history of
domestic violence is harmless error.954 Amy and Rene Limeres were married and had three
children together before they separated in 2011.955 The superior court granted Amy's request for
a long-term protective order in 2011 after Rene threatened to shoot her and repeatedly violated a
no-contact order.956 The court also ordered Rene to complete a batterers' intervention program
and determined that all of Rene's visitation with the children be supervised.957 The couple
officially divorced in 2012.958 In determining that Rene's visitation with the children must be
supervised, the superior court made a finding of fact that Rene had "a substantial and pronounced
history of domestic violence."959 The supreme court affirmed the lower court despite the error,
reasoning that this finding was erroneous because the finding referenced only one incident, and a
history of perpetrating domestic violence requires more than one instance of domestic
violence,960 but ultimately the error was harmless because the superior court based its
determination for supervised visitation on Rene's failure to complete the court-ordered batterers'
classes.961 The supreme court affirmed the superior court's determination, holding that if a
superior court erroneously finds a history of domestic violence, that finding is harmless error if
the court bases its determination for supervised visits on the parent's failure to complete courtordered batterers' classes.962
Molly O v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services
In Molly O vs. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services,963 the supreme court held once
children’s parents have informed the Office of Children’s Services (“OCS”) that they do not
want their children placed with grandparents, any claim by the grandparents of Indian
custodianship under the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”) is terminated.964 Jessica and Aaron
R. have three children, who for purposes of the ICWA are Indian children.965 Jessica, Aaron and
the children lived with the grandparents for most of the children’s lives until the parents lost
custody of their children to OCS in 2011.966 OCS placed the children with the grandparents
initially, but the parents later expressed to OCS that they no longer trusted the grandparents to
care for their children.967 Subsequently, OCS warned the grandparents that the conditions in their
home were unsuitable to raise the children, and despite remedying some of those concerns, OCS
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removed the children from the grandparents’ care later in 2011.968 On appeal, the grandparents
argued that they had never had their status as an Indian custodian of the children under the
ICWA revoked, and thus that OCS’s failure to provide them with notice at the time the children
were removed from their custody deprived them of due process.969 The supreme court affirmed
the lower court's decision, reasoning that OCS was the custodian of the children once they were
removed from their parents care, and that while OCS placed them with the grandparents, that did
not create Indian custodian status for them. Moreover, once the parents informed OCS that they
did not want their children in the grandparents’ care it effectively revoked their Indian custodian
status.970 Affirming the lower court's decision, the supreme court held that the actions of the
parents can terminate the grandmother’s Indian custodianship of the children and the rights of
custody associated with Indian custodian status.971
Rowan B., Sr. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services
In Rowan B., Sr. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services972, the supreme court held that a
denial of a parent’s request to access to information in a Child In Need of Aid (“CINA”)
proceeding constitutes legal error where the trial court relies only on exceptions to disclosures
under the Public Records Act and fails to review the discovery request under the Civil Rules.973
The parent in Rowan B., Sr. moved the court to order law enforcement to produce documents
about the children in question for use in preparation for the children’s CINA proceeding.974
Relying on exclusions under the Alaska Public Records Act, law enforcement opposed the
motion and indicated that such records were protected.975 While law enforcement expressed
openness to providing the court with some records for in camera review, the trial court failed to
conduct such review and denied the parent’s motion, citing the Alaska Public Records Act.976 On
appeal, the State argued that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the parent’s
motion, as the parent had not shown that the error harmed his case in any way.977 The supreme
court reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that the lower court’s reliance on the
exceptions in the Alaska Public Records Act without analyzing the parent’s requests under the
Civil Rules constituted legal error.978 The supreme court further reasoned that as part of the
discovery process, the requesting party may obtain relevant documents from parties who may
possesses such information under the Civil Rules, with consideration to certain exclusions that
may exist under the Public Records Act.979 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme
court remanded the case and held that failure to analyze whether the parent’s need for such
disclosure outweighs law enforcement’s interest in preserving the confidentiality of the
information constitutes legal error.980
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Sandberg v. Sandberg
In Sandberg v. Sandberg,981 the supreme court held that there must be clear evidence of a
movant’s mistake or inadvertence in order for a Rule 60(b)(1) motion to vacate a settlement
agreement to be granted.982 In divorce proceedings against David Sandberg, Brianna Sandberg
assisted in drafting and then signed a settlement agreement in which David received the couple’s
home and Brianna received a portion of David’s 401K.983 Five months after the divorce, Brianna
submitted a Rule 60(b)(1) motion to vacate the agreement under the claim that she was suffering
from poor health when she signed the agreement, did not comprehend what she was signing, and
that she was unable to hold out for inequitable division of property.984 The superior court granted
the motion under a finding that Brianna had a mistaken belief that the parties’ marital home was
David’s separate property; because of this, the court determined that the settlement agreement
did not equally divide the assets and debts of the marriage.985 On appeal, David argued that
Brianna’s agreement to the property settlement was voluntary and fair and that the court erred in
its property valuation.986 The supreme court reversed the lower court's decision,987 reasoning that
there was no evidence in the record that Brianna believed the house belonged only to David at
the time of the settlement.988 Thus, the lower court’s determination that Brianna was entitled to
relief was based on an erroneous factual finding and therefore invalid.989 Reversing the lower
court's decision, the supreme court held that there must be clear evidence of a movant’s mistake
or inadvertence in order for a Rule 60(b)(1) motion to vacate a settlement agreement to be
granted.990
Emma D. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services
In Emma D. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services991, the supreme court held that the Office
of Children’s Services (“OCS”) makes reasonable efforts to reunify a parent with her child, when
OCS provides disability service referrals for the parent, assists the parent in finding housing, and
attempts to contact the parent on numerous occasions to evaluate the parent’s progress and
remind the parent of upcoming appointments, despite the parent’s lack of response.992 OCS
worked to create a case plan with the parent in Emma D., which included referrals to two mental
health service providers, a referral to a housing service, and a bus pass to assist with
transportation.993 Over a period of fourteen months, the parent’s contact with the referred mental
service providers and OCS caseworker were sporadic, as the parent missed two-thirds of her
scheduled visits with her child and more than half of her scheduled visits with her OCS
caseworker.994 On appeal, the parent argued that the lower court erred in finding that OCS made
reasonable efforts to reunify the parent with her child, as OCS did not adequately consider her
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disabilities including bipolar disorder and potential fetal alcohol spectrum disorder.995 The
supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that OCS did take into account the
parent’s disability when the OCS caseworker referred the parent to several mental health service
providers, coordinated with those providers in order to assist the parent in her engagement with
them, and provided the parent with transportation to assist her in receiving mental health
services.996 The court further reasoned that OCS made more than reasonable efforts to reunify
the parent with her child as the OCS caseworker made numerous attempts to communicate with
the parent, intervened to maintain the parent’s visitation rights despite the parent’s failure to
attend the majority of her scheduled visits, and even attempted to find the parent at a homeless
shelter after unsuccessfully attempting to contact the parent over telephone.997 Affirming the
lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that OCS made reasonable efforts to reunify a
parent with her child when the OCS caseworker refers the parent to several mental health service
providers and housing services and consistently attempts to contact the parent regarding the
parent’s case plan and upcoming appointments despite the parent’s unwillingness to engage in
treatment or services.998
Kollander v. Kollander
In Kollander v. Kollander,999 the supreme court held the doctrine of laches is appropriate where
prejudice results when a former spouse unreasonably and unjustifiably delays bringing a claim to
modify a pension division and the delay results in loss of evidentiary materials.1000 Ms.
Kollander sought to modify a pension division in a qualified domestic relations order originally
entered by the superior court in 1992.1001 The lower court held that the doctrine of laches barred
her claim because Mr. Kollander was “irrevocably prejudiced” due to Ms. Kollander’s
unexplained and unjustified delay in seeking to modify her pension division and the expected
loss of evidentiary materials over the years.1002 On appeal, Ms. Kollander argued she was
reasonably diligent in pursuing her remedy, Mr. Kollander failed to demonstrate prejudice, and
the lower court abused its discretion in applying the doctrine of laches because Mr. Kollander
amended his qualified domestic relations order in 2001.1003 The supreme court affirmed the
lower court’s decision, reasoning that the lower court did not clearly err in finding unreasonable
delay and did not abuse its discretion in applying the doctrine of laches because Ms. Kollander
accepted regular payments and did not commence action for years following Mr. Kollander’s
final payment.1004 Additionally, an evidentiary issue existed regarding Ms. Kollander’s
communications with other parties and missing attorney files could potentially prejudice Mr.
Kollander.1005 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that the doctrine of
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laches is appropriate when a former spouse unreasonably delays bringing a claim to modify a
pension division, which results in prejudice due to lost evidence.1006
Boulds v. Nielsen
In Boulds v. Nielsen1007, the supreme court held that a union pension may be considered a
domestic partnership asset subject to division with a cohabitant, and that such a division is not
inconsistent with federal law.1008 Boulds and Nielsen were an unmarried couple that cohabitated
for 16 years, during which time they shared a residence and raised children together.1009 During
this time, Boulds accumulated several employment benefits, one of which was a union
pension.1010 The lower court determined that this union pension was a domestic partnership asset,
and was therefore subject to division.1011 On appeal, Boulds argued that the union pension could
not be divisible with a cohabitant under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(“ERISA”) because cohabitants cannot hold marital property, and Nielsen does not fall into an
enumerated category of allowable recipients.1012 The supreme court affirmed the lower court's
decision, adopting the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning that, as federal law does not define “marital
property right” or “other dependent,” state law definitions should control.1013 The supreme court
reasoned that Alaska law provides for the property division of cohabitants in a way similar to a
marital division.1014 Additionally, the supreme court noted that Nielsen qualified as an “other
dependent” due to the fact that Boulds had claimed Nielsen as a dependent on his taxes and
because they shared a residence.1015Affirming the lower court's decision, the supreme court
held that a union pension is divisible with a cohabitant as a domestic partnership asset consistent
with federal law.1016
Yelena R. v. George R.
In Yelena R v. George R,1017 the supreme court held that the superior court has jurisdiction in a
child custody determination if the state was home to the child six months prior to the proceeding
even if the child is not currently within the state as long as one of the parents remains in the state.
Yelena and George were married in October 2000 after Yelena became pregnant with their first
child.1018 Over the course of their relationship—they were divorced in 2004 but lived together
and had a relationship on and off until 2011—both husband and wife accused the other of
various incidents of physical abuse.1019 The abuse culminated in 2011 when Yelena accused
George of sexually assaulting her.1020 After being denied a permanent restraining order, Yelena
left Alaska with the children and reported the sexual assault to George’s employer—the Coast
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Guard—in Boston.1021 The Coast Guard issued a Military Protective Order against George, held
a probable cause hearing on court-martial charges, and ultimately dismissed charges against
George.1022 In Massachusetts, Yelena was granted a court order giving her sole custody of the
children and permanently restraining George from contacting her, while George sought at the
same time to register orders issued in 2004 and 2011 granting shared custody.1023 The superior
court granted a final judgment granting primary physical and sole legal custody to George and
ordering supervised visitation to Yelena.1024 On appeal, Yelena argued that Alaska lacked
jurisdiction and that the trial court abused its discretion.1025 The supreme court affirmed the
lower court’s holding, stating that Alaska had jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody and
Jurisdiction Enforcement Act—which allows a state to make a child custody determination if
that state was home to the child six months before the proceeding but is not presently in that state
while one of the parents still is—and did not abuse its discretion in fact finding or making legal
conclusions.1026 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the Supreme Court held that the superior
court has jurisdiction in a child custody case where the child no longer resides within the state as
long as the child did reside within the state within the past six months and one parent remains
within the state.1027
Frackman v. Enzor
In Frackman v. Enzor,1028 the supreme court held that new evidence supporting a previous
argument for custody constitutes a material change in circumstances such that the court may
reconsider a custody arrangement.1029 After their divorce, father Enzor and mother Frackman
initially shared joint physical custody of their two children.1030 The superior court granted the
father’s motion to modify the custody arrangement, and reopened a full investigation, after new
evidence became available regarding the mother’s treatment of the children.1031 The father had
continually moved for reconsideration by accusing the mother of being an alcoholic and
suffering from mental illness, but the court had previously declined to reevaluate the
arrangement.1032 After the mother failed to complete court-ordered alcohol testing, and was
diagnosed with several mental disorders, the court changed the custody arrangement—granting
primary custody of the children to the father and only allowing the mother to see her children on
supervised visits.1033 On appeal, the mother argued that the superior court was not justified in
reopening the investigation into the custody arrangement and that the court did not make enough
specific findings to support their alternative arrangement.1034 The supreme court affirmed the
lower court’s decision,1035 reasoning that the superior court did not abuse its discretion because
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new evidence of the mother’s lack of caretaking ability counted as a material change in
circumstances warranting reevaluation of the custody arrangement.1036 Affirming the lower
court’s decision, the supreme court held that a court may consider new evidence of an
accusation’s merit a material change in circumstances for the purposes of reopening and
reevaluating a child custody arrangement.1037
Kristina B. v. Edward B.
In Kristina B v. Edward B.,1038 the supreme court held that the lower court has broad discretion
in assigning weight to the statutory factors, but cannot ignore a factor altogether.1039 Edward and
Kristina began living together in 2006, were married in 2007 and had a son in 2008.1040 They
separated in 2010, with both sides citing, among other reasons, Edward’s history of domestic
violence, Kristina’s substance abuse and Kristina’s Crohn’s disease.1041 On appeal, Kristina
argued that a party who has a history of domestic violence cannot be awarded custody and that
the court failed to weigh Edward’s past domestic violence in awarding him custody.1042 The
supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that the superior court had not been
clearly erroneous in its findings regarding Edward and Kristina’s respective incidents of
domestic violence.1043 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that the
lower court has broad discretion in assigning weight to the statutory custody factors.1044
Grace L. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services
In Grace L. v. State, Dept of Health & Social Services1045, the supreme court held that the Office
of Child Services (“OCS”) made reasonable and active efforts to prevent the breakup of the
family when referring the parent to a psychiatrist in order to participate in a psychiatric
evaluation and discuss medication.1046 In a Child in Need of Aid (“CINA”) hearing, OCS
requested that the court order the parent to undergo a psychiatric evaluation to discuss
medication, which the parent subsequently agreed to attend.1047 During the evaluation the parent
articulated that she was not seeking medication to treat any psychiatric conditions.1048 Shortly
thereafter OCS referred the parent to psychologist in order to evaluate whether the parent’s
mental illness impeded her ability to act as an appropriate parent.1049 The psychologist
recommended the parent be referred to a psychiatrist for a medication review, unaware that the
parent had already had such a review at the encouragement of OCS.1050 The lower court found
that OCS had made active and reasonable efforts to provide the parent with services designed to
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reunify the family, including referring the parent to counseling.1051 On appeal, the parent argued
that OCS had failed to make active and reasonable reunification efforts by failing to implement
her psychologist’s recommendation that she be referred for a psychiatric medication review.1052
The supreme court reasoned that OCS had already provided the parent with reasonable efforts to
encourage her to undergo a psychiatric medication review at an earlier date, which the parent
participated in prior to her psychological evaluation.1053 The supreme court affirmed the lower
court’s decision, holding that OCS had satisfied their duty to make reasonable and active efforts
to reunify the family by referring the parent to psychiatrist to undergo a psychiatrist medication
review.1054
Richter v. Richter
In Richter v. Richter,1055 the supreme court held that a loan taken out during a marriage was
presumptively marital debt.1056 Shelly and Matthew Richter were married in California in
January 2010.1057 They are both helicopter pilots who frequently traveled during their marriage
because of their work.1058 When they were married, Mrs. Richter had over $100,000 in debt from
student loans.1059 Mr. Richter’s mother lent the couple $100,000, which they ultimately used to
pay off Mrs. Richter’s loans.1060 On appeal, Mr. Richter argued that the loan was not marital
debt.1061 He contended that the loan was separate property belonging entirely to Mrs. Richter.1062
He argued Mr. Richter’s mother transferred the money to Mrs. Richter’s bank account, the
transfer was in Mrs. Richter’s name, for the purpose of paying off Mrs. Richter’s independent
loan debt, and that the loan was not marital because the couple was separated at the time it was
granted.1063 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that the loan had
been originally intended for an investment into commercial property which would have been
made by both husband and wife, and that while the couple had discussed separating at the time of
the loan, the parties had not yet separated.1064
In the Matter of Candace A.
In In the Matter of Candace A.,1065 the supreme court held that a social worker with expertise
beyond normal social worker credentials qualified as an expert witness under the Indian Child
Welfare Act (ICWA).1066 In Candace’s Child in Need of Aid (CINA) hearing, the Office of
Children’s Services (OCS) proposed two social workers to testify as “qualified expert witnesses”
under ICWA, in order to demonstrate that continued parental custody was likely to result in
1051
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serious emotional or physical damage to the child.1067 The federal Bureau of Indian Affairs
(BIA) guidelines define a qualified expert witness as a professional person having substantial
education in the area of his or her specialty.1068 The lower court found that the two social
workers did not qualify as expert witnesses because they were not professionals and because they
lacked knowledge of relevant tribal customs.1069 On review, the supreme court vacated the lower
court’s decision, reasoning that the two social workers proposed by OCS qualified as expert
witnesses under the ICWA, because social work contained all the earmarks of a profession.1070
The supreme court further reasoned that Alaska’s case law has strongly implied that social
workers may be qualified experts if they contain expertise beyond normal social worker
qualifications.1071 Because the social workers’ experience included regular exposure to cases and
issues central to the child’s case and lengthy work history in a variety of institutional and agency
settings, the supreme court found that both social workers could serve as qualified witnesses
under ICWA.1072 Vacating the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held a social worker is a
professional qualifying as an expert witness under ICWA and federal BIA guidelines and may
testify in a Native child’s CINA proceeding.1073
Houston v. Wolpert
In Houston v. Wolpert,1074 the supreme court held that the superior court had broad discretion in
determining the best interests of a child in a custody modification.1075 Gary Houston and
Meredith Wolpert divorced in 2010 and agreed that Wolpert would have primary custody of their
daughter and that Houston would have open and liberal visitation rights.1076 However, Wolpert
only allowed Houston one weekend overnight visit per month.1077 Houston filed a motion to
modify custody in 2012, seeking primary physical and sole legal custody of their daughter.1078 A
family court master determined that Wolpert should retain primary custody because she had a
better history of providing the child with continuity and a stable home.1079 The superior court
agreed that Wolpert was better able to provide the child with stability and was better able to meet
her needs, and held that Wolpert would continue to have primary custody.1080 The supreme court
only overturns a superior court's custody and visitation determinations when the records show
that the controlling findings of fact are clearly erroneous or the court abused its discretion.1081
Because the court did not find that the superior court had made clearly erroneous findings of fact
or abused its discretion, the supreme court affirmed the superior court's determination regarding
Wolpert's child custody.1082
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Graham R. v. Jane S.
In Graham R. v. Jane S.,1083 the supreme court held a motion to modify custody based on a claim
of domestic violence was not barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel, where both parties
declined to litigate issues of child custody and domestic violence in a prior domestic violence
proceeding.1084 In the proceeding, Graham R. and Jane S. stipulated to a long-term protective
order regarding custody of their child, and the parties expressly declined to make findings of
domestic violence or child custody.1085 Jane S. subsequently filed and was granted a motion to
modify the existing custody order in superior court, based on a change of circumstances arising
out of a claim of domestic violence.1086 On appeal, Graham R. argued that the lower court erred
in failing to preclude Jane S.’s domestic violence claim, based on principals of res judicata or
collateral estoppel.1087 The supreme court held that fundamental differences between a domestic
violence proceeding and a custody hearing allows an exception to the principle of res judicata, as
the purpose of the parties’ domestic violence hearing was not to address the issue of child
custody, but rather to establish a long-term protective order.1088 Further, the supreme court
reasoned that while collateral estoppel may prevent relitigation of domestic violence issues
already raised and adjudicated, both Graham R. and Jane S. repeatedly declined to make findings
of domestic violence or litigate issues of custody in the domestic violence hearing.1089 Affirming
the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that a motion for modification of custody is
not barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel, where fundamental differences exist between
domestic violence and child custody proceedings, and where neither domestic violence nor child
custody were actually litigated in the domestic violence proceeding.1090
Kyte v. Stallings
In Kyte v. Stallings,1091 the supreme court held that an agency notice constitutes a final order
when the notice clearly indicates both that the decision is final and that an appeal must be filed
within 30 days.1092 Kyte sought a review and modification of his child support obligations with
the Child Support Services Division (CSSD).1093 A few months later, Kyte received a document
from CSSD, captioned in bold letters: “Notice of Denial of Modification Review,” and including
the instructions for an appeal.1094 Three years later, Kyte filed a motion in superior court to
modify his child support obligation, seeking both prospective and retroactive modification.1095
The superior court denied his motion for retroactive modification. 1096 On appeal, Kyte argued
that the notice from CSSD denying his modification was not a final, appealable order, and thus
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his file remained open and allowed for retroactive modification.1097 The supreme court affirmed
the lower court’s decision, reasoning that while form is important, the real question is whether
the substance and effect communicates that the notice is final.1098 The court further reasoned that
taken as a whole, a reasonable reader would understand the agency’s notice to be a final
order.1099 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that an agency notice that
makes apparent both its final nature and instructions on how to appeal satisfies the requirements
of a final and appealable order.1100
Jamie H. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services
In Jamie H. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services,1101 the supreme court held that one
parent could have his parental rights terminated even if the other parent did not have her parental
rights terminated if the child was not in the custody of the parent who retained parental rights
and it did not appear that the child would ever return to the custody of the parent who retained
parental rights.1102 Ian was one of several children of Jamie and Anna.1103 Jamie and Anna both
have mental health issues, addiction issues, and extensive criminal histories, and their
relationship was chaotic and physically abusive.1104 Ian was diagnosed with attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder with complex emotional trauma, probable chronic post-traumatic stress
disorder relative to a disruptive chaotic home environment and exposure to domestic violence
and drug and alcohol use, and probable brain damage, and Ian's issues were compounded by a
lack of care at home.1105 After various encounters and failed interventions with the Office of
Children's Services (OCS), Ian and the other children were removed from Jamie and Anna's
house and put into foster homes in 2011.1106 Since Ian was taken into OCS custody he had
basically no contact with his father but had had a few productive visits with his mother.1107 OCS
filed a petition to terminate Jamie's parental rights of Ian but not Anna's.1108 The lower court held
that Jamie's parental rights should be terminated.1109 On appeal, Jamie argued that his parental
rights should not have been terminated because the lower court did not put in place a specific
permanency plan for Ian and did not terminate Anna's parental rights, even though Ian remained
in therapeutic foster care.1110 The supreme court affirmed the lower court's decision, reasoning
that there was no chance that Ian could become a "half-orphan" because he was not in Anna's
custody at the time of the trial, had an indefinite stay in a therapeutic foster home, and was
unlikely to ever be placed with Anna by OCS because of her parenting history.1111 Affirming the
lower court's decision, the supreme court held that parental rights of one parent but not the other

1097

Id. at 699.
Id. at 700.
1099
Id.
1100
Id. at 697.
1101
336 P.3d 1253 (Alaska 2014).
1102
Id. at 1257–58.
1103
Id. at 1254.
1104
Id.
1105
Id.
1106
Id. at 1255.
1107
Id.
1108
Id.
1109
Id. at 1256.
1110
Id.
1111
Id. at 1256–57.
1098

77

parent could be terminated if there were no chance that the child would be returned to the
custody of the parent who retained parental rights.1112
Dodge v. Sturdevant
In Dodge v. Sturdevant,1113 the supreme court held the superior court has the authority to order a
custodial parent to file an IRS form waiving a federal income tax exemption for one child. 1114 As
part of their divorce proceeding, Karlee Dodge and Frank Sturdevant agreed that Dodge would
have physical custody of their two children, but that each parent would claim a dependency
exemption for one child.1115 The superior court then ordered Dodge to file IRS Form 8332,
which would waive her dependency exemption, so that Sturdevant could file his exemption.1116
Dodge refused, filing a motion to stay the order, which the superior court denied.1117 Dodge
appealed, arguing that the language of Form 8332 showed that the custodial parent must sign the
form voluntarily.1118 The supreme court affirmed, holding the superior court had the authority to
force Dodge to sign the waiver.1119 The court reasoned that nothing in the language of Form
8332, the tax code and regulations, or case law suggested that a court could not order a custodial
parent to sign Form 8332.1120 Moreover, the court cited policy considerations, such as the tax
benefits that flowed to families when the custodial parent transferred exemptions to the higherincome noncustodial parent.1121 Affirming the superior court, the supreme court held the superior
court has the authority to order a custodial parent to file an IRS form waiving a federal income
tax exemption for one child.1122
Riggs v. Coonradt
In Riggs v. Coonradt1123, the supreme court held that a total breakdown in communication
between parents is a substantial change in circumstances that serves as a sufficient basis to
modify custody, even when the motion to modify is based on other grounds.1124 Riggs and
Coonradt were a twice-married and twice-divorced couple with three minor children.1125 They
initially shared physical and legal custody; however, after the second divorce their parental
relationship deteriorated.1126 Coonradt moved for primary physical and sole legal custody of the
children in 2011, citing Riggs’ exposure of the children to substance abuse and violence as the
reason for his request.1127 The lower court granted Coonradt primary physical and sole legal
custody, finding that a complete breakdown of communication between the parents had occurred
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and that placement of the children with their father was in their best interests.1128 On appeal,
Riggs argued that Coonradt had not demonstrated a substantial change in circumstances that
would warrant a modification of custody, noting that his motion to modify was based on
allegations of violence and substance abuse that the court had not found substantiated.1129 The
supreme court affirmed the lower court's decision, reasoning that the decision had been based
instead on the court’s finding that Riggs and Coonradt were unable to communicate.1130 Further,
the supreme court noted that while neither parent had raised lack of communication as a basis for
modification, precedent existed for the court to modify custody based on that ground of its own
initiative.1131 Affirming the lower court's decision, the supreme court held that modification of a
custody order based on a breakdown of parental communication is appropriate even when not
raised in the motion to modify.1132
Chloe W. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services
In Chloe W. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services,1133 the supreme court held Alaska
Native parental rights are appropriately terminated when it is established by clear and convincing
evidence that a child is in conditions that put it at substantial risk of harm, the parent has not
remedied the conditions within a reasonable period of time, and active but unsuccessful efforts
have been made to preserve the Alaska Native family.1134 Plaintiff was a young Alaska Native
mother who suffered from anxiety and depression and was prescribed pills to combat her
symptoms.1135 She exhibited severe emotional instability and, after the Office of Children’s
Services (OCS) determined she was unable to effectively take care of her son, her son was
placed in foster care.1136 Plaintiff communicated her desire to improve her life and resume
custody of her son, but a psychologist reported she remained unable to effectively care for her
son.1137 The superior court held the child’s best interests were best served by terminating parental
rights and giving the child a stable environment in which to grow up.1138 On appeal,
plaintiff argued the superior court erred by finding plaintiff had not remedied the conduct that
put her son at risk and that OCS had not taken active efforts to avoid breaking up the family.1139
The supreme court affirmed the lower court's decision, reasoning plaintiff had relapsed into drug
use which put her son at substantial risk of harm, and OCS had met its active efforts burden in
numerous respects.1140 Furthermore, the court found it was not in the child’s best interests to be
returned to plaintiff’s care.1141 Affirming the lower court's decision, the supreme court
held termination of parental rights is appropriate when the child is at risk of substantial harm if it
remains in parental custody.1142
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Green v. Parks
In Green v. Parks,1143 the supreme court held that a custody order restricting a parent’s alcohol
consumption must be founded on specific evidence demonstrating that use of alcohol directly
affects the well-being of the child.1144 Green and Parks both petitioned the lower court for
custody of their child.1145 The lower court granted Parks custody of the child and provided Green
with approximately fifteen days of visitation per year, provided that Green refrain from
consuming alcohol both while visiting the child and in the eight hours immediately preceding
such visitation.1146 Green appealed, arguing that the lower court lacked substantial evidence
regarding the issue of alcohol abuse, and that the visitation order placed a negative stigma upon
him.1147 On appeal, the supreme court found that a custody order must be supported by evidence
suggesting that the lower court properly considered the best interests of the child.1148 Further, the
supreme court reasoned that findings of fact must demonstrate that a parent’s use of alcohol
directly affects the emotional or physical well-being of a child.1149 Because there was no
evidence suggesting Green’s alcohol use directly affected the child, the supreme found that the
lower court abused its discretion in restricting Green’s alcohol consumption.1150 Remanding the
case for further findings of fact, the supreme court held that specific evidence must be provided
to support a custody award prohibiting a parent from consuming alcohol prior to and during
visitation.1151
Ebert v. Bruce L.
In Ebert v. Bruce L.,1152 the supreme court held that an adoption of a child may not proceed
without the consent of a noncustodial father if the father was justified in failing to support the
child.1153 A married couple attempted to adopt a child despite the biological father’s refusal to
consent.1154 While the child lived with the adoptive couple, the biological father visited the child
but did not pay any child support for over a year.1155 At trial, the couple argued that the father’s
consent was unnecessary under an exception to the consent requirement for noncustodial parents
who unjustifiably fail to support the child for at least one year.1156 The father presented evidence
that his failure to pay child support resulted from his indigence and was therefore justifiable.1157
The superior court denied the adoption petition, finding that the adoptive couple had not proven
that the father’s lack of support for the child was unjustifiable.1158 The adoptive couple
appealed.1159 The supreme court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not clearly err in
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finding the father’s failure to support the child justifiable.1160 The supreme court reasoned that
the father’s failure to pay child support was justifiable because the father remained indigent
despite his efforts to find a job and receive an education.1161 Affirming the superior court, the
supreme court held an adoption of a child may not proceed without the consent of a noncustodial
father if the father was justified in failing to support the child.1162
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HEALTH LAW
In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Gabriel C.
In In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Gabriel C.,1163 the supreme court held that if a court
issues an ex parte order authorizing hospitalization for a full mental evaluation, and the order
requires the person's transportation to another facility for evaluation, the seventy-two hour
deadline for the evaluation does not begin until the person arrives at the new facility.1164 Gabriel
C. was taken into protective custody on February 20, 2011, after his family reported to the police
that he was not taking his psychiatric medication and was displaying erratic and threatening
behavior.1165 A committing magistrate signed an ex parte order that authorized a transfer from
Central Peninsula Hospital to Alaska Psychiatric Institute, stating that a full mental evaluation
must be completed within seventy-two hours of Gabriel's arrival at the new facility.1166 On
appeal, Gabriel C. argued that the time for the evaluation period begins immediately after the
court issues an order authorizing an evaluation.1167 The supreme court affirmed the lower court,
reasoning that that interpretation is not consistent with the language of the statute.1168 Affirming
the superior court's decision, the supreme court held that if an ex parte order authorizes
transportation of a person to another facility for evaluation, the seventy-two hour period for the
evaluation begins when the person arrives at the new facility.1169
Hendricks-Pearce v. State, Dep’t of Corrections
In Hendricks-Pearce v. State, Dep’t of Corrections,1170 the supreme court held that prisoners who
are or were in the custody of the Department of Corrections (“DOC”) are responsible for the
costs of all medical care received while in DOC custody.1171 Dewell Pearce was a prisoner from
1994 to 2008.1172 He sued the State for medical malpractice and was awarded a judgment of
$369,277.88 in 2008, from which the State withheld $140,847 for medical expenses that Pearce
had been provided by the State while in its custody.1173 The superior court found that in AS
33.30.028(a), the statute concerning a prisoner’s liability for medical costs incurred while in
DOC custody, the distinction between “provided” medical care and medical care “made
available” does not release the prisoner from responsibility for medical care costs.1174 On appeal,
Pearce argued that AS 33.30.028(a) and (b) only make a prisoner liable for medical services
“provided,” not for outside medical treatments which are “made available” to prisoners.1175
The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s holding requiring a prisoner to be liable for the
cost of medical care both “provided” and “made available.”1176 The court rejected the argument
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that such a reading creates redundancies within the statute,1177 and demonstrated that both the
plain meaning of AS 33.30.028(a) and the statute’s legislative history show an intent to take full
advantage of prisoners’ available resources for payment.1178 Affirming the lower court’s
decision, the supreme court held that AS 33.30.02 requires a prisoner to be liable for the costs
from all medical services provided and made available to the prisoner.1179
Pletcher v. State
In Pletcher v. State,1180 the supreme court held that an employee of a federally funded residential
substance abuse treatment facility who alerts police that a person drove away from the facility
while intoxicated does not violate federal law or disclose confidential patient identifying
information.1181 John Pletcher IV was a former patient at a federally funded alcohol abuse
treatment center.1182 After his discharge, Pletcher returned to the center, while intoxicated, and
drove away when confronted about his sobriety.1183 An employee then contacted police and,
without identifying Pletcher by name or disclosing his relationship to the facility, alerted the
officer about a possibly drunk driver.1184 On appeal, Pletcher argued that his statutorily protected
confidentiality rights had been violated because the center employee disclosed information to the
police that could identify Pletcher as a drug or alcohol treatment patient.1185 The supreme court
affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the mere identification of a drunk driver,
without further clarifying information, does not satisfy the criteria for confidential
information.1186 The court reasoned that information provided to police did not directly identify
Pletcher as a treatment patient, nor was it obtained for the purpose of treating Mr. Pletcher.1187
The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that the information conveyed
to police about Pletcher’s drunk driving was neither protected nor confidential.1188 The supreme
court held an employee of a federally funded residential substance abuse treatment facility who
alerts police that a person drove away from the facility while intoxicated does not violate federal
law or disclose confidential patient identifying information.1189
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IMMIGRATION LAW
Villars v. Villars
In Villars v. Villars,1190 the supreme court held that the support obligations of an immigrant’s
sponsor can be offset by resources received by the immigrant even when provided by
international family members while the immigrant is outside of the United States.1191 Richard
and Olga Villars were married in Ukraine in 2004.1192 Richard, a U.S. citizen, signed a federal
form agreeing to support Olga and her daughter in the U.S. at 125% of the applicable federal
poverty rate.1193 The two divorced and engaged in litigation for several years regarding Richard’s
support obligation.1194 At one point following the divorce, Richard claimed Olga spent several
months with relatives in Ukraine.1195 After orders from the lower court regarding Richard’s
support obligation for 2010, the parties continued to dispute later years of support.1196 On the
latest appeal of the lower court’s decision, Richard argued that the superior court erred in
calculating his obligations by not including potential offsets, particularly for time that Olga spent
back in Ukraine and was supported by her family.1197 The supreme court reversed the lower
court’s decision, reasoning that the purpose of the support obligation from an immigrant’s
sponsor is to prevent the immigrant from becoming dependent on the state, and in doing so, the
sponsor is required to pay only the difference between the immigrant’s resources and the poverty
line.1198 The court further reasoned that although the relevant statutes and case law were silent,
the court was to adopt the rule of law most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and
policy.1199 In reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that it was only logical
that the sponsor’s support obligation should be reduced if the immigrant receives alternate
support from other sources, including family members abroad, so long as that support meets the
federal definition of income.1200
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INSURANCE LAW
Lockwood v. Geico General Insurance Co.
In Lockwood v. Geico General Insurance Co1201, the supreme court held that a genuine issue of
material fact exists as to the reasonableness of the insurer’s delay of payment where the insurer
delayed payment due to unsubstantiated doubts of the insured’s medical claims without making
any attempt verify those claims.1202 Lockwood sought payment from Geico for medical costs due
to injuries sustained in an automobile collision at the fault of an uninsured driver after exhausting
her medical payments coverage.1203 Geico did not pay for Lockwood’s medical bills, and instead
initially offered to settle Lockwood’s claim for $750, the amount of her childcare expenses.1204
Furthermore, Geico delayed payment because Lockwood’s medical bills seemed high, but did
not request for an independent medical examination until almost three years after the
accident.1205 The lower court granted Geico’s motion for summary judgment.1206 On appeal, the
supreme court found that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to Geico’s reasonableness in
delaying payment due to Geico’s failure to specifically advise Lockwood of its concerns
regarding Lockwood’s medical condition and Geico’s failure to request additional medical
information or an independent medical examination from Lockwood.1207 Furthermore, the
supreme court reasoned that Geico’s proposal of a settlement of $750 to cover Lockwood’s
childcare expenses and subsequent denials to attempt to reach a settlement further indicate that a
genuine issue of material fact exists as to the reasonableness of Geico’s delay of payment.1208
The supreme court reversed the lower court’s hearing, holding that a genuine issue of material
fact exists as to the reasonableness of the insurer’s delay of payment where the insurer delayed
payment due to unsubstantiated doubts of the insured’s medical claims without making any
attempt verify those claims.1209

1201

323 P.3d 691 (Alaska 2014).
Id. at 698–99.
1203
Id. at 693–94.
1204
Id. at 698.
1205
Id.
1206
Id. at 696.
1207
Id. at 698.
1208
Id.
1209
Id.
1202

85

NATIVE LAW
Healy Lake Village v. Mt. McKinley Bank
In Healy Lake Village v. Mt. McKinley Bank1210, the supreme court held that issues of tribal selfgovernance fall outside of State court subject matter jurisdiction.1211 A dispute arose between
two groups of Tribe members concerning the validity of tribal council election results.1212 The
group that believed itself the newly-elected representatives of the Tribe (“the Fifer Group”)
sought access to the Tribe’s bank accounts, held with Mt. McKinley Bank.1213 Due to conflicting
claims of the two groups, the Bank refused to freeze the Tribe’s accounts at the Fifer Group’s
request.1214 The Fifer Group then filed a petition for declaratory relief against the Bank.1215 The
lower court dismissed the claim for want of subject matter jurisdiction, believing the central
issue of the case to be a question of who properly controlled the Tribe, the determination of
which was an internal question retained in the Tribe’s inherent sovereign power.1216 On appeal,
the Fifer Group argued that the case was about the Bank’s failure to comply with its obligation to
grant account access to new Tribe officials, and not an issue of tribal self-governance.1217 The
supreme court affirmed the lower court's decision, reasoning that determining the Bank’s
obligations would require a determination of who properly led the Tribe.1218 Further, the court
reasoned that the State had no interest in determining the outcome of the tribal leadership
dispute; therefore, the issue was reserved to the Tribe.1219 Affirming the lower court's decision,
the supreme court held that State courts have no subject matter jurisdiction over issues of tribal
self-governance, which properly fall within a Tribe’s inherent sovereign power.1220
Simmonds v. Parks
In Simmonds v. Parks,1221 the supreme court held that a tribal court judgment that terminated
parental rights is awarded full faith and credit in a superior court under the Indian Child Welfare
Act.1222 Bessie Stearman, members of the Native Village of Minto and the Native Village of
Stevens respectively, had their parental rights to their daughter terminated after three hearings in
the Minto Tribal Court, establishing that they exhibited substance abuse, domestic violence, and
frequent arrests.1223 The parents did not appeal the decision to the Minto Tribal appellate court,
but instead filed a complaint with the superior court requesting physical custody of their
daughter.1224 The parents argued that the Native Village of Minto is not a federally recognized
tribe, so the superior court should disregard the Minto Tribal Court’s judgment.1225 The superior
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court denied the motion to dismiss the parents’ complaint, and found that the father was denied
minimum due process in the Minto Tribal Court proceedings under both the constitutions of
Alaska and the United States.1226 The supreme court reversed the superior court’s judgment, and
remanded for dismissal of the suit.1227 The supreme court reasoned that the Minto Tribal Court’s
decision to terminate parental rights is entitled to full faith and credit under the Indian Child
Welfare Act because the parents failed to exhaust tribal court remedies before collaterally
attacking the decision in state court.1228 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court
held that tribal court judgments are entitled to full faith and credit in superior court under the
Indian Child Welfare Act.1229
Native Village of Tununak v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services
In Native Village of Tununak v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services1230, the supreme court
held that, while there is a preference for an Alaska Native to adopt an Alaska Native child under
the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), the Alaska Native must formally file for adoption of the
child for the preference to apply.1231 Dawn, an Alaska Native child, was placed in foster care
with a non-Native family when her relatives and Tribe stipulated that there was good cause for
her to be there instead of with an Alaska Native relative or Tribe member.1232 When Dawn’s
birth-mother’s parental rights were later terminated, her non-Native foster family sought to
formally adopt her.1233 Dawn’s Tribe opposed the adoption, seeking that the girl be placed with
her grandmother.1234 However, the grandmother did not formally apply to adopt Dawn.1235 The
lower court granted the adoption.1236 On appeal, the Tribe argued that there must be good cause
to deviate from the Native preference placement standard of ICWA, and that such cause no
longer existed in Dawn’s case.1237 The supreme court affirmed the lower court's decision,
reasoning that the Supreme Court of the United States recently interpreted the ICWA to mean
that an Alaska Native adoption preference may only apply if a preference-eligible party formally
applies for adoption.1238 Further, the Court noted that merely expressing interest in adoption
without going through a more formal process was not sufficient to satisfy the Supreme Court’s
interpretation.1239 Affirming the lower court's decision, the supreme court held that the ICWA’s
preference for adoption of an Alaska Native child by an Alaska Native party attaches only if that
party attempts to formally adopt the child.1240
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PROPERTY LAW
BP Pipelines (Alaska) Inc. v. State
In BP Pipelines (Alaska) Inc. v. State1241, the supreme court held that it is appropriate to use the
“use value” standard in assessing the “full and true value” of property.1242 The Department of
Revenue assessed TAPS in 2006, and the superior court determined that it had permissively used
the “use value” method in making its assessment.1243 On appeal, the Owners of TAPS argued
that per statutory interpretation, the “full and true value” of the pipeline could only be assessed
using the fair market value method.1244 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision,
reasoning that no universal definition of “full and true value” exists, and that legislative history
does not support the Owners’ argument.1245 Further, the court found the superior court’s
reasoning regarding the appropriateness of the “use value” method to assess TAPS to be
sound.1246 The supreme court determined that the value of TAPS streamed primarily from its use
in transporting oil from the North Slope reserves, and that it was both a limited-market and
special-purpose property.1247 Because of these unchallenged facts, the court reasoned that there
was no market on which to base a fair market assessment, and that assessing the pipeline based
on its tariff income would not capture the true value of TAPS.1248 The court held that the “use
value” method is an appropriate means of assessing the “full and true” value of property.1249
Shumway v. Betty Black Living Trust
In Shumway v. Betty Black Living Trust,1250 the supreme court held that incarceration outside the
state of Alaska may be weighed as a factor against Alaska residency for purposes of the
homestead exemption.1251 Black was awarded injunctive and monetary relief against Shumway
for his violation of a small island’s protective covenants.1252 The superior court denied
Shumway’s attempt to claim a homestead exemption for his small house on the island, and
allowed Black’s estate to execute on Shumway’s island property.1253 Shumway was incarcerated
on the date of levy, and will remain incarcerated for approximately eight years.1254 On appeal,
Shumway argued that the superior court erred in reasoning that his involuntary incarceration
meant that he was not a resident of Alaska at the time of levy.1255 The supreme court affirmed the
lower court’s decision,1256 reasoning that the superior court did not clearly err because it
correctly weighed Shumway’s out-of-state incarceration as a factor in determining that he was
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not a resident of Alaska at the time of levy.1257 The supreme court further reasoned that although
Shumway could show intent to maintain a permanent home in Alaska upon his release, his
physical presence was dependent on circumstances beyond his control.1258 Affirming the lower
court’s decision, the supreme court held that out-of-state incarceration may be weighed as a
factor against Alaska residency for purposes of claiming a homestead exemption.1259
Espeland v. OneWest Bank, FSB
In Espeland v. OneWest Bank, FSB,1260 the supreme court held that the identity of a banking
lender has no legal bearing on the legitimacy of a loan when that loan is transferred between
various lenders.1261 Petitioners Mac and Peggy Espeland took out a loan to refinance their
home.1262 Soon after, a financial institution purchased the loan from the lender and securitized
the loan.1263 After the Espelands defaulted on their loan in 2008, their home was sold in a nonjudicial foreclosure.1264 The Espelands brought suit, alleging that the foreclosure was invalidated
by defects in the chain of title because the Deed of Trust was notarized after the document’s
internal reference date and because the identity of the original lender was unclear.1265 The trial
court entered summary judgment against the Espelands and concluded that no defect in the chain
of title prevented foreclosure against the Espelands.1266 On appeal, the Espelands argued pro se
that the lower court erred in entering summary judgment for the banks because a genuine issue of
material fact existed as to the conflicting notary dates as well as the lender’s true identity.1267 The
supreme court affirmed the lower court’s summary judgment ruling, concluding that no chain of
title defect created any genuine issue of material fact.1268 The court further reasoned that the date
of the notary created no genuine issue of material fact because a document may be notarized
after it is signed.1269 While the rights to the loan changed hands many times, the supreme court
found that Alaska law does not require the identity of the lender to be revealed in order to
effectuate a valid loan transfer.1270 Affirming the lower court’s summary judgment ruling, the
supreme court held that a lendee’s knowledge of a lender’s identity has no legal bearing on the
legitimacy of a loan.1271
Purcella v. Olive Kathryn Purcella Trust
In Purcella v. Olive Kathryn Purcella Trust,1272 the supreme court held the right to reform an
irrevocable trust is impermissible where the settlor has failed to establish, by clear and
convincing evidence, that either the trust did not conform to original intent, “unanticipated
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circumstances” substantially affected the furtherance of that intent, or the trust was created as a
product of undue influence.1273 Purcella, an elderly widow and the mother of five sons, owned
the majority of shares in a family corporation.1274 Upon discovering that one of her sons
aggressively and consistently demanded large sums of money from Purcella, her daughter-in-law
recommended she create an irrevocable trust to protect her wealth.1275 Purcella agreed and
executed the trust.1276 Two years later, Purcella filed suit to reform the trust, alleging it did not
conform to her original intentions and that she had not anticipated losing control over her
money.1277 The superior court held Purcella had not established, by clear and convincing
evidence, that she had not intended to create an irrevocable trust or that she had not understood
the terms.1278 On appeal, Purcella argued the superior court relied on clearly erroneous factual
findings.1279 The supreme court affirmed the superior court’s decision, reasoning there was
ample evidence the attorneys clearly explained the terms of the trust and a misunderstanding of
future legal effects does not constitute “unanticipated circumstances.”1280 Furthermore, the court
determined the record lacked clear and convincing evidence that either Purcella’s family or
attorneys exerted undue influence on her into creating the trust.1281 Affirming the superior court’s
decision, the supreme court held there is no right to reform an irrevocable trust absent clear and
convincing evidence the settlor did not intend to create such a trust or was the victim of undue
influence.1282
AAA Valley Gravel, Inc. v. Totaro
In AAA Valley Gravel, Inc. v. Totaro,1283 the supreme court held that oral property assignments
are legally effective and intent can be confirmed by testimony at trial.1284 Totaro brought suit
against AAA Valley Gravel Inc. (“AAA”) for overriding royalty payments allegedly due. 1285
AAA states that when it bought the property from the original owner they were no longer bound
by the sublease and had no obligation to pay royalties.1286 Under the sublease Palmquist had been
given half of the royalties in order to fulfill a debt, while Totaro continued to hold the other
half.1287 Palmquist has expressed his intentions to have that half transferred back to Totaro,
giving Totaro a right to 100% of the royalties.1288 The trial court found that AAA was bound by
the sublease and continues to have an obligation to pay royalties.1289 However, the court found
that Totaro was only entitled to half of the royalties.1290 The court stated that because Palmquist
1273
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was not a party in the suit they could not make any determinations that impacted his property
rights.1291 On appeal Totaro challenges the conclusion that absent a pre-trial arrangement with
Palmquist she is only entitled to half of the royalties.1292 The supreme court reversed the lower
court, reasoning that because Palmquist orally conveyed his property interests to Totaro and
reaffirmed his intent by oral testimony at trial no outside arrangement was needed for the court to
rule on his property rights.1293 The final judgment was vacated and the case was remanded for
considerations on the contract claim.1294 Reversing the courts holding as to what portion of the
royalties were owed to Totaro, the supreme court held that oral property assignments are legally
effective and intent can be confirmed by testimony at trial.1295
Tweedy v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough Board of Adjustment and Appeals
In Tweedy v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough Board of Adjustment and Appeals,1296 the supreme
court held a Matanuska-Susitna shoreline setback requirement applies to a structural addition to a
home if the addition was constructed after the enactment of the requirement.1297 Clifton Tweedy
began renting property built in 1968 and owned by the Matanuska-Susitna Borough on Big Lake
in May 1988.1298 This property was 17.6 feet from the shoreline.1299 In 1987, the Borough had
enacted an ordinance prohibiting structures closer than 75 feet from the high water mark of the
lake, but exempting nonconforming property constructed prior before January 1, 1987.1300 Soon
after leasing the property, Tweedy built an external stairwell on the north side of the house.1301
When he attempted to purchase the property in 2010, the Borough told him that the stairwell did
not comply with the setback requirement and must be removed.1302 Tweedy appealed this
decision to the superior court, arguing that the ordinance applied only to the process of
subdividing property, not to property that has already been subdivided.1303 The superior court
affirmed.1304 Tweedy then appealed to the supreme court, which affirmed, holding that the
zoning ordinance applied to Tweedy’s stairwell.1305 The court reasoned that the ordinance,
properly construed, applied to both preexisting subdivisions such as Tweedy’s and properties in
the process of being subdivided.1306 In addition, this interpretation of the ordinance fit the stated
purposes of the law, which included the promotion of health and welfare.1307 Affirming the
superior court’s decision, the supreme court held a Matanuska-Susitna shoreline setback
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requirement applies to a structural addition to a home if the addition was constructed after the
enactment of the requirement.1308
Young v. Kelly
In Young v. Kelly,1309 the supreme court held work added to the value of individual fishing
quotas (“IFQ”s) prior to the ending of a marriage are not marital property if the marriage ends
before the IFQ program began.1310 Anna Young fished with her husband David Kelly on his boat
during their marriage, contributing to one of David’s highest-yielding years.1311 David’s annual
landings from 1984 to 1990, including the year he fished with Anna, were used to determine the
amount of halibut shares allocated to him under the IFQ program.1312 When the IFQ program
was established, after their divorce, David and Anna decided to avoid litigation of Anna’s
property rights to the IFQ shares and agreed that David would give her money when she needed
it.1313 David stopped paying Anna and Anna filed a lawsuit to determine her property rights.1314
The superior court granted summary judgment concluding that IFQ shares were not martial
property.1315 Anna appealed noting that in some circumstances, such as with pension benefits,
property vested after a marriage ends can be marital property if it is deferred compensation.1316
The court noted that, unlike with pension benefits, at the time of their marriage neither party
expected any benefit from an IFQ program.1317 Therefore, Anna’s premarital work did not
increase the value of an asset because the asset did not exist until the IFQ program was
implemented.1318 The supreme court held work added to the value of IFQs prior to the ending of
a marriage are not marital property if the marriage ends before the IFQ program began. 1319
Alaska Trustee, LLC v. Bachmeier
In Alaska Trustee, LLC v. Bachmeier1320, the supreme court held that all reasonable foreclosure
costs can be included in borrower’s reinstatement amount.1321 Bachmeier defaulted on her
payment obligations on a loan against her home and Alaska Trustee initiated a non-judicial
foreclosure on the property.1322 Bachmeier requested a reinstatement quote in order to make a
payment to stop the foreclosure process, and Alaska Trustee responded with a quote including
foreclosure costs that were not attorneys’ fees or court costs.1323 Bachmeier paid the
reinstatement amount under protest and brought suit against Alaska Trustee, arguing that Alaska
Trustee violated the foreclosure statute by including foreclosure costs in the reinstatement quote
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that were not limited to attorneys’ fees or court costs.1324 The lower court granted partial
summary judgment in favor of Bachmeier, finding that it was a violation of the foreclosure
statute for Alaska Trustee to include fees on a borrower’s reinstatement amount that are not
attorneys’ fees.1325 On appeal, the supreme court reversed the lower court’s ruling, finding that
costs of non-judicial foreclosure other than attorneys’ fees and court costs may be included in the
reinstatement amount as necessary to return the party to its “status quo ante.”1326 The supreme
court further reasoned that absence of express allowance for all non-judicial foreclosure costs to
be included in the reinstatement amount in Bachmeier’s deed of trust is irrelevant, because the
foreclosure statute provides that the beneficiary has a right to be returned to its “status quo
ante.”1327 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that the foreclosure
statute does not limit the borrower’s reinstatement amount to attorneys’ fees and court costs and
allows for the inclusion of all reasonable foreclosure costs in the reinstatement amount.1328
Lee v. Konrad
In Lee v. Konrad,1329 the supreme court held a property lot’s boundary line has been established
by acquiescence where adjoining owners have mutually recognized it and consent to trespass is
an affirmative defense that invalidates a continuing trespass claim.1330 Plaintiff owned a property
lot and conducted a survey to determine the boundary line against the adjacent lot.1331 Several
owners of the adjacent lot agreed with plaintiff that the boundary line was correctly established
and so plaintiff erected fence poles to demarcate the lots.1332 Plaintiff later deposited excavation
fill along the boundary line and the current adjacent property owner affirmatively disavowed any
complaint or issue.1333 Defendant bought the adjacent property, conducted a land survey, and
claimed plaintiff’s boundary line was incorrect.1334 The superior court held (1) defendant’s
survey correctly determined the boundary line and (2) plaintiff’s fill encroachment constituted a
continuing trespass.1335 The court ordered plaintiff to remove the fill material, erect a barrier to
prevent future encroachment, and pay attorneys fees.1336 On appeal, plaintiff argued the lower
court selected the incorrect boundary line and improperly applied a new standard of adverse
possession.1337 The supreme court reversed the lower court's decision as to the boundary line,
concluding that where property is reasonably marked and adjoining owners mutually recognize
the boundary, the line has been established by acquiescence.1338 As to the trespass claim, the
supreme court reversed in part, reasoning that although additional encroachment by the fill
material after defendant bought the lot constituted a trespass,1339 the previous owner’s consent to
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the encroachment was an affirmative defense to that prior trespass so there could be no
continuing trespass claim.1340 Reversing the lower court's decision in part, the supreme court held
a new property owner’s claims against the adjacent property owner’s actions are limited by prior
owners’ express consent to those actions.
Briggs v. City of Palmer
In Briggs v. City of Palmer,1341 the supreme court held that Alaska law permits property owners
to testify about their property's value before and after an alleged taking.1342 In 1989 Ray Briggs
purchased two parcels of land from the Small Business Administration.1343 Those parcels abut
Palmer Airport, the noise from which led Briggs to sue for inverse condemnation.1344 Briggs
alleged that the noise interfered with the use and enjoyment of his property, such that the
disturbance rendered the property without any use. On appeal, Palmer argued Briggs’s testimony
ought not be admitted as evidence of the diminution of his property’s value.1345 Palmer argued
that only expert testimony is admissible as evidence of a change in property value for inverse
condemnation claims.1346 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that
under Alaska law Briggs can testify as to the value of his property before the alleged taking took
place and then the value after the taking.1347 Noting developing case law, the court emphasized
that property owners have a right to testify not just about the value before damage, but also
after.1348 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s order granting summary judgment,
holding that a party is entitled to testify as to the value of her property both before and after an
alleged taking.1349
Farmer v. Alaska USA Title Agency, Inc.
In Farmer v. Alaska USA Title Agency, Inc.,1350 the supreme court held that failure to provide renotice after postponement of a nonjudicial foreclosure does not violate equity or the Alaska
Constitution.1351 Here, a family purchased a lodge from the plaintiff then defaulted on the
mortgage when, lacking insurance, they fell five months behind on payments and failed to pay
real estate or room taxes.1352 The plaintiff subsequently commenced nonjudicial foreclosure
proceedings, and the foreclosure sale was postponed six times from its initial date.1353 For the
initial foreclosure sale date, the family had received a notice of default and a notice of sale by
mail and personal service, but for each of the postponements there was simply a public
announcement on the sale dates.1354 The superior court held that the foreclosure sale was
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properly conducted and properly postponed.1355 On appeal, the family argued that actual notice
of the postponements was necessary under equity and procedural due process.1356 The supreme
court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that equity did not require actual notice
because it would impose a significant burden on a routine transaction and because the family was
willingly inattentive.1357 The court also reasoned that the public announcement provided
sufficient notice and thus did not violate procedural due process.1358 Affirming the superior
court’s decision, the supreme court held that failure to provide re-notice after postponement of a
nonjudicial foreclosure does not violate equity or the Alaska Constitution.1359
Chung v. Rora Park
In Chung v. Rora Park,1360 the supreme court held the general rule of recovery in a trespass
action does not apply if recovery is disproportionate to the loss in property value and there is no
personal reason to restore the land.1361 Chung (“Lessee”) commenced excavation for a
foundation of the new house he intended to build on the property Rora Park (“Landowner”)
leased to him.1362 During excavation, the workers cleared around fifty trees from Landowner’s
property and the Lessee failed to explain why.1363 The superior court held the Lessee’s workers
trespassed on Landowner’s property and awarded damages equal to the cost of restoring the trees
on the property.1364 On appeal, Lessee argued the damages award was inappropriate because the
property value did not diminish.1365 The supreme court reversed the lower court's decision,
reasoning Landowner did not personally value the land and so damages to restore the trees she
did not value constituted a windfall.1366 Reversing the lower court's decision, the supreme court
held a landowner must demonstrate diminished property value or a personal attachment to
property in order to receive recovery damages for trespass.1367
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TORT LAW
Regner v. Northstar Volunteer Fire Dep’t
In Regner v. Northstar Volunteer Fire Dep’t,1368 the supreme court held that on summary
judgment for a negligence claim along with a discretionary immunity claim the court must
address all of the decisions challenged when granting discretionary immunity and the moving
party must ask for summary judgment on the negligence issue for the decisions the court does
not address.1369 Regner brought suit against the fire departments and several employees who
responded to the fire at his motor home.1370 Regner used a fire torch in an attempt to warm
frozen pipes causing a fire.1371 The firemen put out the fire in the house first before preceding to
the fire in the well house despite the fact that Regner insisted they precede the well house
immediately.1372 Regner alleges this negligently caused additional damage to his motor home
while the fire department states this was the safest way to put out the fire.1373 The superior court
granted summary judgment on the discretionary issue and on the issue of negligence because
Regner did not offer evidence of negligence to rebut that all firefighting activity was done in
accordance with firefighting practices.1374 On appeal Regner challenges the conclusion that he
failed to make a sufficient showing of negligence.1375 The supreme court reversed the lower
court, reasoning that because the fire department did not move for summary judgment on the
negligence claim the defendants did not meet their burden for summary judgment and Regner
was not put on notice to produce sufficient evidence on the negligence claim.1376 Additionally,
because the superior court did not address all of the decisions challenged when granting
summary judgment on the immunity claim those decisions were not barred in the negligence
claim.1377 Reversing the summary judgment on Regner’s negligence claim, the supreme court
held that on summary judgment for a negligence claim along with a discretionary immunity
claim the court must address all of the decisions challenged when granting discretionary
immunity and the moving party must ask for summary judgment on the negligence issue for the
decisions the court does not address.1378
Steward v. State
In Steward v. State,1379 the supreme court held that the State’s decision not to reinstall a guardrail
along a highway shoulder, made in a design study and approval documents, entitled the State to
discretionary immunity.1380 In August 2005, after colliding with another vehicle, a woman
drowned when her car slid off Richardson Highway then entered and submerged in the Tanana
River.1381 There was no guardrail between the highway and the riverbank at the time of the
1368
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accident.1382 Based a design study which determined there was an adequate clear zone separating
the highway shoulder and the riverbank, the Alaska Department of Transportation and Public
Facilities had removed and decided not to reinstall the previously existing guardrail in 1994.1383
The lower court held that the decision not to reinstall the guardrail retained the State’s
discretionary immunity in tort cases.1384 On appeal, the woman’s estate and surviving
spouse argued that the State’s decision not to reinstall the guardrail was an operational act and
thus not a discretionary function.1385 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision,
reasoning that the design study and approval documents leading to the State’s decision were part
of the planning stage and thus entitled the State to discretionary immunity.1386 Affirming the
lower court's decision, the supreme court held that the State’s decision not to reinstall a guardrail
along a highway shoulder, made in a design study and approval documents, entitled the State to
discretionary immunity.1387
Mattox v. State, Dep’t of Corrections
In Mattox v. State, Dep’t of Corrections,1388 the supreme court held that the Department of
Corrections’ (“DOC”) duty to protect inmates in its care from reasonably foreseeable harm
includes assaults by other inmates.1389 While incarcerated by the DOC, Mattox, a white man,
shared a cell with Aaron, a black man.1390 Mattox alleged that he reported racially motivated
threats made by Aaron and Aaron’s friends, to correctional officers and requested to be moved to
a different module in the facility.1391 Some time after Mattox allegedly reported the threats,
Wilkerson, who was a friend of Aaron, punched Mattox in the face, causing multiple fractures
and requiring hospitalization and surgery for the injuries.1392 After his release from prison,
Mattox filed suit, alleging that the DOC failed to protect him after Mattox put the DOC on notice
of the threat to his personal safety.1393 The trial court entered summary judgment for the DOC,
concluding that Mattox failed to raise any genuine issue of material fact on the question of
whether the DOC breached its duty to protect him from any reasonably foreseeable harm because
Mattox’s reports of threats were too general to put the DOC on notice.1394 On appeal, the DOC
contended that inmate attacks are only reasonably foreseeable when the prison officials act with
deliberate indifference to the inmate’s communication of specific, immediate, and identifiable
danger.1395 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s summary judgment ruling, concluding
that assaults by other inmates fall within the DOC’s duty to protect inmates from reasonably
foreseeable harm.1396 The supreme court determined that Mattox’s alleged reports of threats,
requests to be transferred, and identification of his potential attackers raised a genuine issue of
1382
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material fact as to whether the attack was reasonably foreseeable.1397 Reversing the lower court’s
summary judgment ruling and remanding the case, the supreme court held that the DOC’s duty
to protect its inmates may include assaults by fellow inmates when those attacks are reasonably
foreseeable.1398
Pralle v. Milwicz
In Pralle v. Milwicz,1399 the supreme court held it will not overturn a jury verdict when the record
shows there is sufficient evidence to support the verdict.1400 The defendant (“Milwicz”)
negligently rear-ended the plaintiff (“Pralle”)’s car, after which Pralle filed suit for personal
injury.1401 The jury found there was sufficient evidence that, although Milwicz was negligent, her
negligence was not a substantial factor in Pralle’s injury because two prior car accidents had
caused Pralle documented injury.1402 The superior court thus held for Milwicz.1403 On appeal, the
plaintiff argued (1) the jury did not spend adequate time considering the available evidence and
(2) the jury ignored the medical testimony that Milwicz caused injury.1404 The supreme court
affirmed the superior court, reasoning (1) the amount of time a jury spends deliberating is
inconsequential if it has carefully examined the evidence and (2) the jury reasonably concluded
the doctor’s testimony did not necessarily yield a finding of causation.1405 The court also held the
superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying challenges against jurors who agreed to set
aside personal opinions about the facts of the case.1406 Affirming the superior court’s decision,
the supreme court held if there is sufficient evidence supporting a jury’s finding, the court will
not overturn the jury’s verdict and lower court’s judgment.1407
Achman v. State
In Achman v. State,1408 the supreme court held that the Department of Corrections (“DOC”) has
no heightened duty to take additional steps to prevent an inmate from attempting suicide when
that inmates suicidal ideation is not reasonably foreseeable to the DOC.1409 Charles Kemp
attempted suicide while in administrative segregation at Anchorage Correctional Complex.1410
Kemp survived, but suffered a serious brain injury.1411 Kemp’s mother, Marjorie Achman,
brought suit on behalf of Kemp against the State of Alaska alleging negligence against the DOC
for failing to protect Kemp from self-harm.1412 The trial court entered summary judgment for the
DOC, concluding that Achman failed to raise any genuine issue of material fact on the question
of whether the DOC breached its duty to protect Kemp from reasonably foreseeable harm,
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including self-harm.1413 On appeal, Achman argued that Kemp’s medical records before
incarceration and his possession of certain books while incarcerated raise a genuine dispute of
material fact as to the foreseeability of Kemp’s suicide attempt.1414 The supreme court affirmed
the lower court’s summary judgment ruling, concluding that Kemp’s suicide attempt was not
reasonably foreseeable.1415 The supreme court determined that neither Kemp’s previous medical
records, which the DOC did not have access to, nor his possession of certain books, including the
Bible, were sufficient to make Kemp’s suicide attempt reasonably foreseeable.1416 Affirming the
lower court’s summary judgment ruling, the supreme court held that the DOC has no heightened
duty to protect inmates from attempted suicide when that inmate’s suicidal ideation is not
reasonably foreseeable.1417
Conley v. Alaska Communications Systems Holdings, Inc.
In Conley v. Alaska Communications Systems Holdings, Inc.,1418 the supreme court held that a
superior court does not abuse its discretion when it allows evidence for permissible purposes that
is then used in trial for impermissible purposes if the opposing party fails to object to the use of
evidence in that way or request a limiting instruction.1419 Conley was a tractor-trailer driver who
was injured while making a delivery to another company.1420 Conley sued Alaska
Communications Systems Holdings, Inc. ("ACS") for negligence.1421 Before trial, Conley filed a
motion in limine to exclude evidence of his prior work incidents and write-ups, arguing that that
evidence would be used impermissibly for propensity.1422 The trial court denied the motion
without comment, presumably because ACS demonstrated that the evidence was relevant to nonpropensity purposes.1423 At no time during the trial did Conley object the ACS's use of the
evidence or request a limiting instruction that the evidence not be used for propensity
purposes.1424 On appeal, Conley argued that the superior court abused its discretion by allowing
the evidence of his prior work incidents to come in since that evidence was used for propensity
purposes at trial, and that he had no obligation to object because the motion in limine to preclude
the evidence had been denied.1425 On review, the supreme court held that each piece of disputed
evidence could reasonably be seen to have some permissible relevance and that the probative
value of the evidence was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.1426 Affirming the
superior court's decision, the supreme court held that the superior court does not abuse its
discretion when it allows evidence for permissible purposes that is then used in trial for
impermissible purposes if the opposing party fails to preserve its objection.1427
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Pouzanova v. Morton
In Pouzanova v. Morton,1428 the supreme court held that testimony which provides evidence for
multiple arguments must be given context for its relevance and must be more probative than
prejudicial to be admissible.1429 After she drove past a stop sign and was broad-sided by another
vehicle, the defendant driver in a tort action did not contest liability for the accident, but disputed
the extent of the plaintiff driver’s injuries.1430 During trial, the district court allowed testimony
for the plaintiff’s claimed damages for loss of enjoyment of life, which included evidence of the
plaintiff’s domestic violence, particularly an alleged incident where the plaintiff threatened her
husband with a hammer.1431 Acting as an intermediate court of appeal, the superior court found
the district court made reversible error,1432 reasoning that evidence of the hammer incident
should have been excluded as it was not given enough context to make it relevant and it was
more prejudicial than probative.1433 On appeal, the defendant argued that the plaintiff’s ability to
hold a hammer was proof of her recovery from injuries from the accident, and thus was
admissible as evidence.1434 The supreme court affirmed the superior court’s decision, reasoning
that the testimony was too vague, given the presence of additional evidence of domestic
violence, for jurors to make that connection.1435 The court also reasoned that the testimony was
unfairly prejudicial because the point of domestic violence in the plaintiff’s marriage had been
made repeatedly throughout trial.1436 Affirming the superior court’s decision, the supreme court
held that testimony which provides evidence for multiple arguments must be given context for its
relevance and must be more probative than prejudicial to be admissible.1437
State, Dep’t of Health and Social Services v. Mullins
In State, Dep’t of Health and Social Services v. Mullins1438 the supreme court held a jury verdict
that allocates the majority of fault to a negligent tortfeasor when both the negligent and
intentional tortfeasor are responsible is unreasonable.1439 Upon receiving a report that 8-year old
Alecia and 6-year old Shayna Mullins (“the girls”) were abused by their mother, the Office of
Children’s Services (“OCS”) took the girls into custody and placed them in the care of their
grandparents (“the Mullins”).1440 Three years later, the girls reported that their grandfather had
sexually abused them for years.1441 The counselor who had been working with them during that
time noticed patterns of behavior that were symptomatic of sexual abuse, but testified she never
suspected abuse occurred.1442 Following the girl’s report, the grandmother became abusive and
the girls were finally placed in different care.1443 The girls filed a complaint against OCS, for
1428

327 P.2d 865 (Alaska 2014).
Id. at 870.
1430
Id. at 866–67.
1431
Id. at 867.
1432
Id.
1433
Id. at 870.
1434
Id.
1435
Id. at 870–71.
1436
Id. at 871.
1437
Id. at 870.
1438
328 P.3d 1038 (Alaska 2014).
1439
Id. at 1042.
1440
Id. at 1039.
1441
Id.
1442
Id.
1443
Id. at 1039–40.
1429

100

failure to protect them from harm, and the Mullins, for assault and battery.1444 The jury returned
a verdict that OCS’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing the harm to the girls and the
Mullins’ conduct did not cause harm to either of the girls.1445 The jury allocated 95% of the fault
to OCS and 5% to the abusive mother, and none to the Mullins.1446 OCS moved for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, which the superior court denied.1447 On appeal, OCS
argued the superior court should have granted a new trial because the jury’s allocation of fault
was irrational.1448 The supreme court reversed the superior court’s decision, reasoning the jury
verdict was irrational because OCS could not reasonably be held liable for the acts of the other
tortfeasors, and it was an abuse of discretion not to grant the motion for a new trial.1449 The
Mullins could not be deemed zero percent responsible for the intentional abuse they inflicted on
the girls.1450 Reversing the superior court’s decision, the supreme court held allocation of fault
and damages cannot be excessively attributed to a negligent tortfeasor over an intentional
tortfeasor.1451
Donahue v. Ledgends, Inc.
In Donahue v. Legends, Inc.,1452 the supreme court held that the Unfair Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection Act (“UTPA”) does not apply to personal injury claims.1453 Donahue was
injured when, at the suggestion of an instructor, she dropped from a bouldering wall during a
class at the Alaska Rock Gym, owned by Ledgends, Inc.1454 Donahue signed a waiver of liability
prior to the class,1455 but sued the Rock Gym for negligence and for violating UTPA, contending
that the Rock Gym’s advertisements misleadingly advertised the gym as a safe place.1456 The
Rock Gym moved to dismiss the UTPA claims on grounds that the act does not apply to personal
injury claims.1457 The superior court granted the Rock Gym’s motion for summary
judgment.1458 On appeal, Donahue argued that, although the UTPA covers the loss of money or
property as a result of bad practices related to consumer goods and services, given that the court
had not yet decided whether the statute includes personal injury claims, damages for personal
injury should be recoverable.1459 The supreme court affirmed the lower court's decision,
reasoning that there is nothing in the UTPA’s legislative history to support Donahue’s contention
that the Act covered liability for personal injury and would supplant negligence as the basis for
such liability.1460 The incongruities between the elements of common law personal injury claims
and the UTPA were too significant for the court to assume, without clear legislative direction,
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that the legislature intended the act to provide an alternative vehicle for personal injury
suits.1461 Affirming the lower court's decision, the supreme court held that the UTPA does not
apply to personal injury claims.1462
Greene v. Tinker
In Greene v. Tinker,1463 the supreme court held that the superior court did not err in finding that
Greene did not have an absolute defense to defamation under the First Amendment and the
Alaska Constitution.1464 Beverly Tinker was an employee at Pilot Station Health Clinic, a facility
at which Karen Greene was a patient.1465 Greene and Tinker are distant cousins, and their
families have negative history.1466 In 2007, Tinker improperly accessed Greene’s medical
records.1467 Four years later, in 2011, while pregnant and attending the clinic, Greene accused
Tinker again of improperly accessing her medical files when Greene became aware that Tinker
knew of Greene’s pregnancy, despite substantial steps by Greene to prevent Tinker from finding
out its details.1468 Greene accused Tinker of improperly sharing information from the file—that
Greene was pregnant—with a clerical employee at the clinic.1469 In truth, Greene had told a
mutual acquaintance of Tinker, who in turn told Tinker’s sister who told Tinker.1470 Tinker was
fired from the clinic after Greene’s accusation.1471 On appeal, Greene argued she had an absolute
defense to a defamation claim under the First Amendment right to free speech and the Alaska
Constitution.1472 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, because under wellestablished United States Supreme Court precedent Greene was entitled to at most conditional
privilege when making a defamatory statement, and that here she was not even entitled to
that.1473 The supreme court also affirmed that the Alaska Constitution does not provide an
absolute protection of defamatory speech, but only a similar conditional privilege which did not
attach here.1474 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that under
Supreme Court and Alaska precedent there is no total protection from defamation claims.1475
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